Africa

A Mozambican Newspaper With a Difference

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The author brings to light a Mozambican newspaper – named @Verdade – which does not follow traditional financial models, and has in turn become a “tool for change”. The name of the newspaper curiously contains an @ symbol. Their English language website can be found here. 

By Roberto Valussi, 27th August, 2013

Today marks the 5th anniversary of the birth of a very rare creature in the contemporary media landscape: an independent, respected, profitable, popular and free newspaper. The square was circled not in some glitzy borough of London, but in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique.

The product in question is the weekly newspaper @Verdade (‘Truth’ in Portuguese, the country’s official language), which has become the most read national newspaper since 2010, only two years after its first number was fit to print. Its slogan is ‘A Verdade não tem preço’, which translates to, ‘the Truth is priceless’.

@Verdade is more than a newspaper; as its founder Erik Charas put it, “I did not start the venture for the business or for the media aspect. My intention was to uplift the country, to contribute in order to do change.”

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Deja vu: The French Intervention in Mali

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On January 11, 2013, French President François Hollande sent a military expedition to rescue Dioncounda Traoré’s government from the “imminent terrorist threat”. Camille Maubert, a security analyst, explores this turn of events. 

By Camille Maubert, 16th January, 2013

Five days after the French “surprise” intervention in Mali, it is – to say the least – not clear what operation Serval is all about. Brandishing UN Article 51 (which proclaims the individual and collective right to protect a member subjected to armed aggression), French President François Hollande sent a military expedition to rescue Dioncounda Traoré’s government from the “imminent terrorist threat”.  750 ground troops, 30 tanks and several Rafale combat planes have thus been mobilised to strike Islamist strongholds in the North and West of Malian territory, making, according to “security sources”, important damage to the groups’ bases and leadership.

However, doubts are rising as to what the ins and outs of the intervention are in a context where reliable information is scarce. Indeed, most of the information publically available relies on two sources. On the one hand there are the official communiqués published by the various actors’ communication outlets which are often politically biased, and which are therefore unreliable and/or contradictory. For instance, while French defence spokesperson announces 60 terrorist casualties, the Malian army increases their number to “hundreds” and Islamic groups refuse to make any statements. On the other hand, the local press predominantly relies on witness accounts from the population and “local officials”. The weakness of such sources is patent, as they are based on what people saw, or think they saw, and therefore produces subjective and incomplete interpretations.

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Libya, the Arab Winter?

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In this essay, the author explores the fragile security situation and the rise of Islamist groups in post-revolution Libya. 

By Camille Maubert, 3rd October, 2012

Libya, through the persisting instability and violence ten months after the demise of Colonel Gadhafi, illustrates how fragile revolutionary gains can be. Indeed, the fall of the regime led to the disintegration of the status quo, the polarisation of the political scene and the assertion of new power relations. As the regime fell, so did the unity that the tyrant coercively insured over the great multiplicity of groups in the country, and this political break up resulted in the (re)-emergence of voices and groups with diverging agendas, interests and allegiances. The fight against the repressive regime united a multiplicity of actors from various tribal and socio-economic backgrounds into a strong, inclusive, but leaderless movement which disintegrated after the fall of the dictator. The uprising lost its unity at the moment when it lost its enemy. As a result, the constituents of this heterogeneous movement reorganised themselves in various groups with different – and sometimes competing – agendas. Among them are Islamists, which are the focus of this study because of their central role in the on-going violence. The security vacuum which stemmed from such a sudden change gave rise to instability, violence, and the empowerment of un-democratic actors – armed militias, terrorist groups, and so on – and increased insecurity in the wider Sahel region.

Accordingly, this paper aims to address the security consequences of the Libyan uprising by asking ‘How did the popular revolution impact on the regional security environment?’ In other words, it seeks to analyse the repercussion of the instability intrinsic to the post-revolutionary transitional period on Islamist activities in order to assess the shape and extent of the terror threat in the region. It argues that the security landscape is characterised by an increased Islamist presence which feeds on the instability, weak governance and widespread violence to expand its activities and audience.

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Angola’s Election Day – An interview with MC Carbono

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A note on the run-up to the Angolon elections that were held on August 31st, 2012.

By Roberto Valussi, 4th September, 2012

The 31st August 2012 marks the day of the Angolan presidential elections; the second one after the 27 years of civil war of 1975-2002. The last time the Angolan population went to the poll was in 2008, when the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – which emerged victorious in the conflict – obtained an enviable 82%.

The transparency of the electoral process was a concern then and it has only grown on this occasion. Many  have denounced the irregularities, some of which has already hit the international news. The main opposition party, UNITA – which lost the war – organised a rally last Saturday calling a postponement  of the elections until a decent standard of transparency is met.

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The Fallout from the Lagos Plane Crash: The $25m question for the NCAA’s Harold Demuren and his Son

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In the aftermath of the Nigerian air disaster, Sardonicus looks at the crises in Nigerian aviation. Poor regulation, corruption, nepotism and a general failure of the system could all have been contributing factors to the tragedy. This article looks in particular at the endemic corruption and nepotism within the aviation authorities.

To provide a pretext for this article here is a brief excerpt from a recent article in the New York Times on flying in Nigeria:

A plane for a major Nigerian carrier was approaching Lagos at the end of a recent all-night international flight. The city came into view – the warren of streets near the airport was below – and the plane seemed to be descending. Suddenly the view changed.

“The plane was flying over fields and swamps. The city receded into the distance. Yet the weather was perfect. The plane was no longer, it seemed, approaching Lagos. After a few minutes, the captain’s voice came over the intercom: “Ah, distinguished ladies and gentlemen” – this is how Nigerian pilots address passengers – “I’m sorry, but I’ve missed my landing. I’m going to have to try again.”

The plane became very quiet. The flight attendants were frozen in their seats, their faces immobile. After 10 minutes, the pilot tried again, and the plane landed without incident.

On a recent domestic flight – again involving a major carrier – the small jet hit heavy turbulence. It went on and on, the plane bouncing up and down, minutes turning into a quarter-hour and a half-hour.

The pilot’s voice came over the intercom – but not to give information about the flight. To sing. In a cracked and wheezy baritone, the (evidently) aged pilot began to intone an improvised ditty in praise of his own carrier: “Oh, I love to fly Air Nigeria! Air Nigeria is the best!”

The plane bounced up and down, and the captain sang.

Eventually the jet landed at its provincial destination. The passengers, almost all Nigerians, disembarked, impassive and silent. They appeared to be used to these ordinary experiences that edge near – uncomfortably close – to the extraordinary.

By Sardonicus, 14th June, 2012. Continue reading →

Is Mali the ‘next Afghanistan’?

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This article is a re-publication of a piece by Andrew Lebovich on his website, al-Wasat.  It analyses the popular attitudes on the security situation in northern Mali to look at the potential risks to international security and the risks that are, at present, overstated.

Mr. Lebovich is a contributor to the popular foreign policy blog The Washington Note, and his work has appeared at ForeignPolicy.com and The Atlantic Online. He also writes a formerly weekly, and now twice-weekly brief with Foreign Policy on legal issues in the struggle against terrorism, the Legal War on Terror (LWOT).

By Andrew Lebovich, 13th June, 2012.

The title of this post is a question I’m seeing more and more, and it reflects the growing concern in Washington, Paris, and African capitals that the security situation in northern Mali is spiraling out of control. In this kind of environment, bad news tends to echo loudly and quickly. The most recent example of this is the strong reaction in the international press to an interview Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou gave to France 24 this week, in which he said that Afghans and Pakistanis were in Mali training fighters, in addition to confirming that French hostages held for nearly a year and a half by AQIM were in “good health” and still alive. This news has garnered quite a bit of attention, especially in the Francophone media, though it should be noted that RFI reported the presence Pakistani trainers in Timbuktu and in Kidal a month ago, to considerably less attention. Still, this and other signs of the degradation in the security environment in northern Mali and the growth of AQIM have spurred speculation about whether or not northern Mali was becoming a “West African Afghanistan“, a new Somalia, or a jumping-off point for terrorist attacks elsewhere.

While I think some of this concern is warranted, I think some of this language and concern may be, for the moment, a bit overwrought, as I will explain in this piece. This post is my attempt to sort through some of the current popular attitudes about the security situation in northern Mali, the very real risks to regional and international security that may be looming in the north, and the equally real constraints on militant groups attempting to impose shari’ah in northern Mali or project force beyond Mali’s already porous (or nonexistent) borders.

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Vogue Italia’s ‘Rebranding Africa’ Disaster

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In this article Elliot Ross of Africa is a Country dissects the ‘Rebranding Africa’ edition of Vogue Italia.  The author attacks the concept of outside intervention as a defining characteristic of Africa before dealing with some of the more troubling assumptions made by the magazine.  It is a fantastic read.

This article was originally published on June 6th, 2012 on the website Africa is a Country.

By Elliot Ross, 8th June, 2012

Everybody’s trying to rebrand Africa, and it isn’t going so well. Vogue Italia’s latest issue — boosted by great billowing gusts of editorial hot air from both the New York Times and the Guardian — is called “Rebranding Africa”, and as you’d expect the whole thing is an embarrassing and insulting shambles. The images are okay, but otherwise it feels like something a middle-schooler cobbled together for a class project. And then got a “D” for it.

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What is Happening in Nigeria? Blood and Oil (Subsidies)

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In this article the author looks at the current wave of political and economic turmoil sweeping Nigeria.  With a potential oil shutdown sending waves of panic across Brent Crude prices and terrorism forcing the closure of the borders the state is facing its largest crisis since its return to civilian rule in 1999.

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by Jack Hamilton, 14 Jan, 2012

In 2010 the BBC released the controversial docudrama: ‘Blood and Oil’. It depicted a Nigeria crippled by corruption, protests and terrorism and was slammed for the tropes of endemic sleaze and violence. Executions, inhumane oil politics and the collusion of leading politicians in these atrocities were seen to reflect the Nigeria of the past. This is now the Nigeria of the present and it could be about to get a lot worse.

Occupy Nigeria

Naija Rising

This week the country closed its borders following counter-terrorism advice from the UN and a popular strike threatens to entirely shut down oil and gas production (accounting for over 90% of the export market) on Tuesday if demands are not met. There have been two crucial ultimatums:

1. Boko Haram has threatened to kill all Southerners (read: Christians) in the north if their demands of religious reform are not met. The attacks have already begun.

2. Occupy Nigeria has threatened to grind Nigeria’s export economy to a halt if their demands to maintain the fuel subsidy are not met. The deadline has been extended until Tuesday.

Facing a potential civil war and economic collapse, the Federal Government of Nigeria must act decisively.  There is no quick-fix.

There Might Be Blood – Subsidy Strikes

Who is Drinking Nigeria's Milkshake?

Nigerian oil and gas workers have threatened to shut down the Nigerian oil market, deepening the strikes against the withdrawal of petrol subsidies.  The government and unions are locked in talks which have been extended by two days as of today.  This leaves the government until Tuesday to find a solution or face economic meltdown.

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (Pengassan) have put all production platforms on red alert in anticipation of a shutdown. This demonstrates the lack of optimism in resolution being reached in time.

The crisis in Africa’s largest oil exporter has already had an international impact. Oil prices have already risen in anticipation of the shutdown and Nigeria’s export reserves would only last for six weeks.

Brent Crude prices have risen by $1 per barrel in a single day and in a global crude market already shaken by conflict in the Middle East and North Africa, a shutdown in Nigeria could have expansive ramifications. In an election year the last thing a US incumbent would like to see is a pinch at the pumps.

While the true international impact of the crisis is yet to be fully realised, it has already had a devastating impact domestically. The price of fuel has already more than doubled and the prices of other goods, including food, are skyrocketing. People are struggling to get to work, to put food on the table and to run their electricity generators. If the strike turns violent it is these people who will suffer.

Subsidies are seen to be the only benefit most Nigerians receive from the vast oil riches of the country. The argument for their removal is that they cost the state $8 billion per year in funds that could be better used on infrastructure and development. In a country in which government corruption is rife and the trust in the state is dangerously low it is clear that the people would like to see the money conferred through subsidies rather than pilfered by the ‘1%’.

The subsidy involved a huge amount of corruption but its removal does not equate to the removal of the corruption. It is merely a relocation.

Spreading Terror

The north of Nigeria is ‘sliding towards a full-blown guerrilla war’ according to The Economist. Boko Haram bombing campaigns have intensified since the Christmas Day attacks and acts of retribution have been carried out in the Christian south. The burning of a mosque in Benin City, southern Nigeria, demonstrates the dangerous roadmap the northern insurgency could instigate.

Fears abound over the potential links between Boko Haram, a small cult whose primary objective is the removal of secular education, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  Assertions of a broader terrorist network were originally purported by sources in the American military (AFRICOM) and the Algerian Government but on Tuesday this fear was also echoed by the United Nations.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has stated that ‘concerns will increase’ as the popularity of Boko Haram grows. The alleged sophistication of the attacks, especially the bombing of the UN in Abuja, has provided some substance for these assertions but the most recent activities reflect burgeoning brutality, not capability.

Goodluck Jonathan has responded to the fears of a vast terrorist network by closing the borders of the country. Nigeria’s international borders are now operating on high alert as the latest measures demonstrate the degree of force the Federal Government is willing to use to achieve peace and stability across the country.

Elevated force does not necessarily provide a solution for the state.  They are fighting a guerrilla organisation, galvanised by support from those who fear the encroachment of an over-zealous central government.  Memories of egregious state violence mean that heavy state mobilisation is likely to increase rather than diminish the allure of the Boko Haram message to those who feel alienated from the state.

Will Things Fall Apart?

The Occupy Nigeria protests and Boko Haram attacks are entirely separate movements with the common theme of opposing the Federal Government of the country. With opposition to government threatening the security and the economy of the nation questions abound over the future of Nigeria.

Jonathan has announced palliative measures the mass production of buses to ease the transport issues in the country as well as reducing government salaries by a quarter (although they remain obscenely high in such an impoverished nation).

The most recent response to Boko Haram has been a change in language. Jonathan has acknowledged that the support base may be more than purely criminal. In his speech on Monday he admitted that there may even be members of his government that identify with the organisation.

Talks with Occupy Nigeria have been extended by two days but there is a general lack of optimism for a rapid resolution. Boko Haram are intensifying their attacks and flickers of retribution have begun in the south. At present neither crisis shows signs of abating and the Federal Government is floundering.

Nigeria is being plunged into a future which looks ominously similar to its past. In this scenario ‘Blood and Oil’ appears rosy.

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For more on the recent crises in Nigeria and terrorism across West Africa see these articles on InPEC:

The State of Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rising Threat of Boko Haram

Photo Essay: 6 Reasons Terrorism is Gaining Momentum in Northern Nigeria

Securing Emptiness: The Sahara Desert and the Global War on Terror

The State of Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rising Threat of Boko Haram

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In this article the author assesses the rising threat of the Nigerian terrorist organisation, Boko Haram.  The most recent spate of bombings and executions has raised questions over the unity of the Nigerian state and the future of security on the continent.  It is therefore necessary to understand why Boko Haram is increasing in popularity as their attacks become increasingly barbaric.

By Jack Hamilton, 14 Nov, 2011

Unchecked Massacre

Brutal attacks in Nigeria over the past week have left over 100 people dead.  A single small religious group has transmogrified into a dynamic terrorist organisation capable of rapidly changing tactics and targets in a pattern of violence responsible for over 1000 deaths in northern Nigeria since 2009.

Last week the gunmen wandered around the northern town of Damaturu killing any Christian who could not recite the Islamic creed on the spot.  Nigeria’s Defence Minister Bello Halliru Mohammed has stated that the security forces once again have control and that there is nothing to fear but his words have assured few.

The fact remains that there is still no coherent strategy to combat Boko Haram.


Rising Intensity

The nature of recent events has shocked many, even in regions where Boko Haram attacks are frequent.  Residents expressed rage at the ease with which gunmen were able to take over the city and leave bodies littering the streets.  Police stations, mosques and churches were reduced to rubble before the security forces mobilised a response.  At that point members of the group engaged in gun battles across the city that lasted for hours.

The situation in northern Nigeria is degenerating rapidly.  International observers fear that Boko Haram may already have links to al-Qaeda and al-Shabab and that the campaign of terror shows no signs of abating.

In order to understand Boko Haram it is first necessary to look at who they are, what they want and how they believe they can achieve it.

Who

Boko Haram colloquially translates as “Western education is forbidden”.  It is a claim to reject all things Western from the theory of evolution to Western-style banking.  This has manifested itself in different tactics since the emergence of the group in 2002.  Before 2009 there were no signs that the group desired the overthrow of the state and rather preached to withdraw from the institutions of the non-Sharia Nigerian nation.  It was a law banning the riding of motorbikes without helmets that would prove to be the catalyst for violence.

In July 2009 the central government sought to enforce the law on helmets.  Boko Haram flouted the legislation and was subjected to police brutality which in turn set off an armed uprising in Bauchi, later spreading to Kano, Borno and Yobe.  By the time the army had suppressed the situation over 800 people were dead across the north of the country.

Since 2009 the group has spread rapidly.  The majority of the attacks have taken place in Borno state but Boko Haram have also expanded to the northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Katsina and Sokoto as well as the attacks on Abuja and threats against Lagos.  In addition to the geographical spread there has been a change in tactics from the localised skirmishes to strategic suicide bombing campaigns and massacres directed not only at Nigerian security forces but also international targets such as the UN.

Tactics

Boko Haram have changed their tactics over the years.  Under their previous leader, Mohammed Yusuf, the group staged mass uprisings against the police and suffered hundreds of casualties.  After Yusuf’s death at the hands of security forces in 2009 they began using tactics more in line with jihadist terrorism including the first suicide bombings in Nigeria’s history.

The attack on the UN may have been an attempt to pressure the international community or perhaps it was simply to embarrass the Nigerian state but it succeeded in drawing global attention to a burgeoning problem.  Boko Haram may be diffuse but it is expanding geographically with increasing tactical sophistication.

Composition

As Boko Haram expands the questions over their composition complicate.  According to Paul Lubeck, an expert on northern Nigeria, Boko Haram is not a single group but a collection of splinters banded under one name by the Federal Government.  One section appears willing to negotiate while others remain determined to intensify the bombing campaign.

Some statements reflect a strict adherence to Islamic law while others cite a determination for a smaller Nigerian state as their raison d’être.  If the group is as amorphous as Lubeck claims it will make it very difficult to negotiate with let alone combat.

Grievances

Economic

The structural issues of northern Nigeria have allowed Boko Haram to thrive in recent years.  In addition to acute poverty the region has a high birth rate and 50% of the population are below the age of 30.

Inequality, unemployment and industrial stagnation have exacerbated the perception that the north has been marginalised by the liberalisation of the Nigerian economy.  The question of who owns the land has not been answered since independence and the Federal State seems too far away and blighted by corruption to deal with such issues.

Political

Grievances in the north were compounded by the election of a southerner, Goodluck Jonathan, as President earlier this year.  Jonathan assumed the office following the death of the northern Muslim President Umaru Yar’Adua and many northerners believe Jonathan should have stepped aside to allow another northerner to take Yar’Adua’s place.  This would have been in line with the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that the Presidency should rotate between the north, the south-west and the south-east every two terms.

Security

The administration is treating Boko Haram as a security issue rather than tackling the divisive subject of poverty in the north.  Abuja’s response has been to flood the north with heavy-handed military and police forces that now stand accused of human rights violations against civilians.

Politicians in the north have begged for the numbers of security forces to be reduced as police corruption has become rife.  For many in the north the police are the face of the central government.  The people feel alienated from a force they perceive to be corrupt.

Responding to Boko Haram

For many the heavy military presence in the north is the single most important hindrance in securing any negotiated peace.  The failed attempt to destroy the group in 2009 was the greatest recruitment drive Boko Haram could have hoped for, especially the controversial extra-judicial killing of the leader Mohammed Yusuf.

The current strength of Boko Haram is largely a result of such poor foresight by the Nigerian state.  As a result there is now a security vacuum in the most heavily militarised region of the country.

Flagrant myopia has created martyrs and swelled the ranks of the guerrillas.  The legal response to the killing of Yusuf is a good first step but it does little to combat the issues of poverty and corruption that are integral to Boko Haram’s recruitment.

Opposition leaders in the north claim that the government has failed to understand the amount of support Boko Haram has amongst the population.  By stating their opposition to central government and corruption the group has grown far beyond their initial religious doctrine and the government will need to find a response to the structural inequalities in Nigeria if the terrorists are to lose their supporters.  It does not appear as if this is going to happen any time soon.  It is possible that Boko Haram may actually be growing beyond the borders of Nigeria.

The Anti-Social Network?

Many experts have questioned whether the increased tactical sophistication of Boko Haram is evidence of the group branching out to international terrorist organisations, especially al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  A change in tack to target international organisations with large high-tech bombs has caused concern.  General Ham, head of US Africa Command, believes that the worst case scenario already exists and that Boko Haram are working in tandem with AQIM and al-Shabab in a “loose” partnership.

Hard evidence for any such link is still to be produced.  The geographical distance between AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabab make such a partnership unlikely and the possibility remains that the increased military technology may have come from within Nigeria itself.  Alex Thurston, an expert on terrorism in the region, has posited that it is more likely the sophistication came from disaffected Nigerian soldiers than any international training.

The Future State of Nigeria

The failure of the government reactions have meant that Boko Haram has been successful in achieving one of their primary goals: the weakening of the legitimacy of the state.  Attacks on international organisations have created increased pressure on Jonathan to find a solution to the problem.  The short-term solution of heavy military deployment may eventually yield similar successes to those against the militant groups in the Niger Delta but it would also undermine the cohesion of Nigeria.  This would also act to provide momentum for Boko Haram.

The failure to develop a clear strategy to combat the small Islamic group in 2009 has forced the Nigerian state to face up to the larger structural issues concerning the north.  A solely military solution is no longer feasible.

Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics: Africa’s Statistical Tragedy

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In this article the author assesses how flawed statistics may be exacerbating poverty in Africa.

By Jack Hamilton, 3 Nov, 2011

This week the UN has declared that there are 7 billion people in the world. It is impossible to verify this statistic but the reasoning behind the declaration is clear. It raises awareness of population growth and draws attention to future development issues. But what of the more dangerous statistics that have been exacerbating poverty? In Africa especially poverty estimates have been based upon flawed data with potentially disastrous consequences. With so much being written now about African growth, the data behind it must be questioned to reveal the statistical tragedy of Africa.

‘The Century of Africa’?

In the past decade Africa has surged forward. Its economy is growing faster than that of any other continent. Foreign investment has hit an all time high and the middle class is absorbing consumer goods at rates comparable to China and India. Articles on African optimism abound, normally at the turn of the year when it will inevitably declared that this is to be the ‘Year of Africa’, the ‘Decade of Africa’ or in the new book by Michel Severino and Olivier Ray, the ‘Century of Africa’. That is not to say that it will not be true. Rather the statistics behind this must be evaluated as well as the capacity to harness resources for development.

Africa Rising

Around one third of African growth over the last decade has come from a rise in commodity prices. These have been combined with increased investment from China as a low cost builder. Further investment has come from around the globe from Brazil to Iran, Turkey to South Korea leading to the defensive rhetoric of Hillary Clinton in declaring a ‘neo-colonial’ era on the continent. This is an unfair overestimation of external influence for Africa’s best friend has been Africa itself.

Regional economic cooperation has increased dramatically on the continent. Borders are becoming easier to cross and technology is advancing rapidly. Africa has more mobile phone users than the Americas and mobile financial transfers on a single phone network in Kenya are greater than the annual global transfers of Western Union. At the start of the year there were 17m Facebook users in Africa and this figure is expected to be 28m by the end of the year. As mobiles and data become more affordable the numbers will continue to surge. The political implications of this connectivity have been in the news due to the revolutions in the North but the economic impact on Sub-Sahara could have even greater consequences. The rapid distribution of agricultural information alone has been revolutionary.

While the rest of the world struggles through the economic meltdown Africa is growing and political violence, so long the cancer of growth, is declining. Tensions still simmer in Sudan, Congo and Angola but pale in comparison to their previous intensity and the talk of ‘new wars’ is receding and the markets are opening. This is not to overstate the case as Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray have done in calling the 21st century ‘the century of Africa’. Africa’s rise is impressive but how many Africans are moving to China to set up factories?

The problem with the optimistic projections is that they are supported by figures which cannot be verified. Data is immensely unreliable to the point that we don’t know how many people are living in poverty or how quickly most of the continent is growing. In the words of the World Bank Chief Economist for Africa, Shanta Devarajan, Africa has a statistical tragedy.

Statistical Tragedy

The use of the term ‘tragedy’ is a reference to Bill Easterly and Ross Levine’s ‘African Growth Tragedy’ in their 1997 paper of the same name. This outlined the destructive link between economic growth and poverty in increasingly open markets. The financial gap is seen to be widening with the ‘Growth Tragedy’ placing the exacerbation of poverty at 2-3% per year. This has been placed as high as 6% more recently. World Bank estimates claim that overall poverty in Africa is declining at a rate of around 1% every year but Easterly and Levine demonstrate that this poverty is becoming more acute. The tale of the rising African middle classes does not include the plight of those at the bottom.

The tragedy is this assumption that growth is rising while poverty is declining. The statistical tragedy is that we don’t even know the real poverty rates. World Bank growth rates are based upon the imprecise science of GDP which is itself based upon national accounts. We need to take into account that only 11 Sub-Saharan African states currently use the World Bank GDP system. Most of the countries use older GDP measuring systems with some dating back as far as the 1960s.

In Ghana the system of national accounts was updated by the World Bank leading to a GDP figure that was 62% higher than previously thought. The World Bank took credit for the leap but failed to take account of the fact that it was their system which had systematically undervalued the Ghanaian GDP for the previous twenty years thus hampering long-term economic growth.

Only 39 countries in Africa use GDP systems which can be used to provide comparable estimates. National poverty estimates taken over a long period of time in a single nation are difficult to generalise beyond individual borders and the impact of conflict further limits them. How can one talk about continental poverty with only a single statistical point of reference? Furthermore the estimates are not comparable over time as the methodologies frequently change between estimations. An estimate on Kenya in the late 1980s would incorporate 235 items in the consumption basket whereas the early 1990s model had more than 600. Today this figure is in the 900s and rising.

While economists have been congratulating themselves for the declining poverty rate they have not been looking at the limitations of the data. It is not up to date. There is no uniform 2011 estimate. Of the 39 African countries that use GDP only 11 have comparable data for the same year. For the rest of the continent there is a need to extrapolate back to 2005. In the case of Botswana we need to go back to 1993.

Africa is given as the recurring example as the continent is an especially bad case when it comes to statistical tragedies. There are on average 3.8 poverty estimates from each country to the World Bank. Taking the African continent in isolation this drops to 1.5. In Africa the national estimates for 2005 have just been collated.

Why has this happened?

Statistics are fundamentally political. A poverty estimate involves the government declaring whether or not their people are better off today than they were five years ago. If a government is standing for election it would be in their interests that a negative report is not published. The consequence of this is a delay in the financing of such projects until after the election meaning that much of the raw data is not published or at least withheld until it is anachronistic.

The trope of condescending economic optimism for Africa is often checked with the accusation of poor governance. In this capacity progress can be verified. In Zambia defeated President Rupiah Banda, leader for the last twenty years, bowed out gracefully last month. From 1960 until 1991 no African leader was voted peacefully out of power with the exception of Mauritius. Since 1991 this has occurred in 30 of the 54 nations on the continent. The one party state is no longer the norm. Vast amounts of money are now spent on elections with Nigeria setting the world record earlier this year in spending $580m in an attempt to have a free and fair election, a figure which may be surpassed in Congo later this month. The figures in this case demonstrate the desire for change but also the scale of the problem. Only today it was revealed that a one month old baby is on the government payroll in Nigeria. He is also said to have a diploma.

It remains to be seen whether the winds of democratic change in the North and increased transparency south of the Sahara will see a rise in independent judges and neutral civil services but there is a clear case for optimism in African politics despite the verisimilitude of economic statistics.

Transparent Solutions

If the problem with statistics is the politics then the solution must come through transparency. Kenya’s open data initiative is a shining example of this, especially after the recent electoral violence. Secondly the behaviour of donors should also be evaluated and made public. This would stop organisations taking credit for aiding a negative situation which they helped to create. Thirdly, those found manipulating or withholding statistics must be named and shamed. Unfortunately this most important of factors is entirely dependent on the success of the first two. Much talk remains over neo-colonialism and foreign investment in Africa but it is the African politicians who need to open up, not the markets.