Month: October 2011

The Revolution is Being Televised

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In this article, the author explores the role of the media in reporting the protests seen around the world in the past few months.

By Mikael Santelli-Bensouda, 31 Oct, 2011

We live in exceptional times. The seemingly endless reach of the media brings popular movements and struggles of all persuasions into the public domain. From protests against educations cuts and austerity measures to pro-democracy revolutions, in one way or another, they are all accessible. But in what capacity are they being presented to us? There are huge inconsistencies in the manner in which societies’ information distribution mechanisms reflect upon the mobilisation of the masses.

As Derrida sensibly wrote, “nothing exits outside a context”. As such, any specific event is ascribed meaning through its contextualisation. Much like blinkers, context frames a given reality within a discourse that permits understanding. These blinkers are (consciously or not) constructed through an amalgamation of cultural norms and values, national history and worldviews. It is thus pertinent to understand that, from sender to receiver, information will have been contextualised in accordance to the sender’s worldview that is formulated by the media. In essence, the exchange of information between official outlets – whether the media, police or politicians – and the general public is pre-framed to influence the receiver.

The Fires of London

The disturbances that took place in August in London seemed to appear out of nowhere and spiraled out of control to a level on par with the social unrest in the 1980’s. Those events were widely condemned by the national media, political leadership and the majority of the British public alike. Whilst not wishing to dispute the validity of specific incidents, the virtually unanimous description of the incidents as riots and looting established a deep seeded negative connotation. In fact, the lexicon used to report the events seemed to oscillate around terms including thugs, opportunism and youth culture. The consequence of this is the establishment of a generalised and disconnected group, in this instance young people of a certain political class and ethnicity, and their separation from the main public body. By doing so, there emerges the establishment of a them, the maladapted and disruptive elements of the society, which, by extension reinforces an us. It is through this process that we can explain why blame derived from almost every angle (unruly attitudes, the decadence of education, computer games, rap music and even according to one (un)credible commentator, Patois) except the very societal factors that may have contributed to such disconnectedness.

The overwhelming drive to establish this group as a deviant societal sub-category suffocates deeper analysis especially one that attempts to understand their rationale, even if it is found that, by and large, there was none. Such condemnation transcended all levels of society, from the Prime Minister to the local cabby, and was especially prevalent within the media. The latter subtly reinforced the dividing lines between the deviant hooligans and the bastions of authority the police, who were interestingly described as the force in a bid to restore their legitimacy in the epically over-hyped battle to reclaim the streets. So, we ignored what may have been a nation-wide cry of dissatisfaction with society, swept it under the rug, and occupied our time by demanding a return to social order and punishment for troublemakers. Perhaps most worryingly is the unintended consequence of this affair. Whilst creating an other may foster a sense of unity amongst us, it risks sewing the seeds of a self-fulfilling prophecy wherein this disconnected group begins to believe what society thinks of them by accepting its deviant status and even embraces it.

Qualms with Capitalism

The recent protests aimed at the corrupt and immoral financial system that has severely affected virtually ninety nine per cent of us. It is epitomised by the ‘Occupy campaigns’ that have sprouted across the west from its original formation in New York to sympathetic permutations in London, the Republic of Korea and Jamaica to name but a few. These parallel movements showcase their frustration against the corrupt and unjust banking and financial systems that have been able to get away with the biggest economic injustice since colonialism. It is not a sentiment that is held by a mere minority. Anger and disbelief are global phenomena.

Intriguingly, a substantial amount of the reporting on these protests empathise little with the causes. There is little or no media support for the protests whatsoever; little or no glorification, no accounts of brave people who dare to speak on behalf of a disgruntled society. Instead, they are confronted with headlines like The Siege of St Paul’s, and their cause is belittled by generalization and the callous infusion of negatively connoted terminology including: anarchists, anti-capitalism, communism, disgruntled students and even Marxist revolutionaries.

The information that is espoused intends to devalue the efforts that are being showcased as they are portrayed as disturbing the order. By doing so, there emerges the establishment of a socially constructed and generalised group that is detached from society through a process of association and differentiation. Once a group has been identified as deviant it generally perturbs the general public and deters affiliation. Much like the consequences of the London riots, rather than engaging in debate about the true nature of discontentedness; which in this instance is the demand for greater accountability, transparency and judicial equality (after all these ideals are the foundation of our society), there is a manipulation of the movement to reduce its impact. Its very essence is intentionally distorted to evoke a separation between those who want to overthrow the capitalist system and every one else; who will remain pacified.

Another Day, Another Struggle

Moving beyond manipulation of social unrest within the west, we are confronted with seemingly endless stories of struggles in distant lands. It seems that there is an increasing sense of inevitability of events that originate in the global south and its redistribution. Education protests in Chile, religious solidarity in Nepal and democratic revolutions in Syria are, more often than one would like to think, contextualised through a veil of western superiority. As those people strive to attain a societal standard on par with what we have in the west, we hold the power to confer legitimacy upon such incidents (or not). Yet, needless to say, unless action in a foreign place threatens our interests, it remains out of our sphere of interest.

It is interesting to note that different geographical examples of social mobilisation, despite similar intentional goals, often receive a distinctly varied reception dependent on its location and its relation to the reporting press. For example; education protests in the UK were troublesome but in Chile they are conceived as a sign of progress in society. Similarly, protests against oppressive rule in Palestine are constructed within a negative frame and often ignored while those occurring in Iran are encouraged. Although it may be unfashionable to refer to orientalism in this day and age, it is hard to overlook the fact that the western media conveys a post-colonial hierarchy among states by granting selective support to its government’s clients.

Double Standards

The Arab Spring exemplified a media and political phenomenon across the world. Looking back to the initial outbreak of mass popular protest across North Africa it is interesting to notice that the media and politicians seemed to adopt no real stance. Perhaps for the first time in modern Arab history (excluding events in Palestine) the west abstained from publicly passing judgment, if only temporarily. A waiting game ensued.

In fact, a delicate balancing of interests was underway. Whilst initially not wishing to alienate authoritarian allies, whom for so long they had propped up and abused as geopolitical tools, the West could not jump on its archetypal bandwagon of backing democratic demands. However, it could not condemn such popular power in the event that the movement was successful. It is for that reason that, only once the dice of history had been firmly cast on the side of the people, did the west find its position. The discourse machine then went into overdrive; pro-democracy revolutionaries, heroes of the Arab world and lovers of freedom invaded the headlines and framed perceptions.

What was occurring was an attempt to overcome distance and difference by removing the sense of otherness by creating unity; people who share the values of democracy. So, unlike the discourse constructed on protests within the West, the context of the Arab Spring was intended to unify groups and extend legitimacy upon the events. Surely then it is no surprise to see how the events unfolded in Libya. Images of distress and asymmetric warfare resonated deep across peoples, as we had grown attached to these like-minded freedom lovers and, consequently, military intervention to assist the march of democracy against tyranny received widespread and unquestioning acceptance.

As history has proven, the West only conducts military operations when there is just cause, usually established through the construction of a narrative and on the odd occasion has been a matter of ‘self-interest’. The narrative constructed prior to the Libyan intervention emphasised shared values. It surely had nothing to do with oil, not this time. The connection of values/interests established through cross-societal bonding via image bombardment and discourse assimilation ultimately produced general acceptance for the ‘need to act’. Yet what about the uprisings in Syria?  A similar process to create empathy occurred but commitments were only made to economic sanctions. Perhaps, it was assumed that they are capable of fighting for themselves against a regime far more oppressive and evidently trigger happy than Ghaddafi’s. What about the protests in Bahrain? That is a story that should only be whispered. Limited reporting on attempts to overturn the constitutional monarchy stems directly from the fact that it threatens the Saudi Royal Family’s monopoly on authority and has taken painful steps to crush what is framed as a Shia rebellion. Due to the world’s insatiable appetite for oil, the Saudi’s prerogative ensures that the events either follow their own narrative construction or are lost in an informational void. Blinding self-interest is the driving force behind the way the West has viewed, acted upon and has constructed the narrative for the Arab Spring.

Revolutionary Inflections

These differing examples highlight how discourses surrounding certain events emerge from its initial contextualisation prior to dissemination. It helps to explain why certain acts are perceived in differing ways, even if they share the same principles. Such contextualisation derives from the desire to understand the reason for certain events by viewing it through a familiar lens (i.e., a British worldview). Through this process it reinforces cultural norms by creating dividing lines between what is acceptable in society and what is perceived as deviant even if there remains huge inconsistencies in its implementation. Essentially, if a certain movement challenges or questions the societal structure, and the position of a privileged elite, they are likely to be perceived negatively regardless of whether the country observes the universal values of democracy.

Revolutions all over the world are being televised. Over the past few months there have been constant updates on the progress being made by NATO and the NTC in Libya, how Basher Al-Asad continues to brutalise the people of Syria and the spread of the Occupy campaigns throughout the world like wildfire. However, their intended messages are often distorted or manipulated to serve a greater purpose, one that continues to sustain the hierarchical cross-societal structure that has dominated the world for centuries. The revolution is being televised with the intention of preserving the class structure within the UK, the West or the world.

Oil and the Arabian Peninsula: Blessing or Curse?

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In this article, the author assesses the success rate of how oil-rich countries in the Arabian peninsula and beyond have tackled the challenge of increased oil revenues and how they have handled their newly established wealth. For many, oil has been a curse in disguise, with mismanagement of oil revenues, unequal distribution of wealth and the Machiavellian power of the rentier state – which in the case of Libya proved to be fatal.

By Matthias Pauwels, 26 Oct, 2011

Roughly a century ago, nobody would have imagined that a complex mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights and other liquid organic compounds would become the most contested, sought-after commodity in the world. Oil-rich countries in the Middle East have been the scene of epic battlegrounds to gain control over the black gold. As a crafty tool to conduct psychological warfare, petrodiplomacy has become an important diplomatic weapon to the Arab nations against the West and, in particular, Israel. When crude oil found its way to the international market during World War II, the world became increasingly dependent on Arab oil. For over half a century, the oil industry of the world outside North America and the Soviet Union had been dominated by seven great international oil companies, exercising control over output and off-take prices. However, the tide was turning. By the 1960s-1970s control over Middle Eastern oil was rapidly passing into the hands of governments in the area and out of the hands of the heretofore dominant Western companies. International oil companies, once the beneficiaries of lucrative concessions and tax arrangements, slowly lost the control they traditionally exercised over Middle East oil production and pricing and had to accept policies determined unilaterally by the producing nations.

Consequently, a sudden increase in the rate of revenue flows to the Middle East simultaneously presented the economic planners of the region with an unprecedented opportunity and challenge. Over the past decades, very large increases in the revenues accruing to the oil-exporting countries have given rise to extravagant hopes of a swift acceleration in their economic development.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, we are able to assess the success rate of how these countries have tackled the challenge of increased oil revenues and how they have handled their newly established wealth. Here I am arguing that for countries of the Arabian peninsula, oil, paradoxically, is a curse in disguise. Although the possibilities of oil revenue flows appeared unbridled, these governments have largely crumbled under the huge pressure to properly utilise this wealth.

Firstly, the mismanagement of large proportions of oil revenues is embedded in the asymmetry of economic, political, and cultural perspectives. Practices such as unwise spending policies and loose budgetary controls have produced the caricature – so popular in the West – of the rich Arab with dark glasses and his Rolls Royce. Secondly, unequal leaps of development in the Middle East, often based on oil revenues, have accentuated multilateral social and economic inequalities. As a result, Pan-Arabism has declined. Thirdly, the sole concentration on oil revenues has proved to be a slippery slope: declining oil revenues in an undiversified economy leave young people with reduced changes and disappointment, creating a breeding ground for Islamism to firmly nestle itself in the consciousness of the common Arab youth. And finally, the most desirable course for relations between consumers and producers of oil remains the issue of heated argument. Over the past decades, the world has witnessed several oil crises, the establishment of OPEC and severe fluctuations in oil prices, directly affecting the world economy. Rather than moderating with time, the debate of optimising the relationship between consumers and producers of oil remains volatile.

1.      The paradox of oil: a financial curse in disguise

The actual utilisation of oil as a strategic commodity of great political potency as well as developmental power has left the Middle East faced with numerous challenges. When Saudi Arabia imposed the first income tax on oil companies in 1950, the law was specifically designed to capture fifty percent of the profits attributed to crude oil. As a result of these arrangements, the revenues of oil-producing countries of the Arabian peninsula soared, and their governments seemed satisfied. As time moved on, a final transfer of power of petroleum from companies to governments in the 1973-1974 period created the opportunity to fully gain control over oil revenues. Although there was a realisation that oil resources of the region would ultimately be depletable and the development of more diversified domestic economies, capable of generating their own funds for investment, should be made a “first priority goal”, the Middle East has received considerable criticism for the way they have handled their new wealth. In this context, authors such as Sayigh allude to the misdirection of an inordinately large proportion of oil revenues into the private accounts of rulers, continuing wastefulness, loose budgetary controls and unwise spending policies which permitted overconsumption and the formation of private “princely fortunes” in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf sheikhdoms.

 (Click to enlarge image)

It is certainly true that the construction of superhighways and the building of stadiums that will only be filled sporadically fully testify to the folly of oil revenue investments. The real estate investment bubble of Dubai has burst, a process which was accelerated by the financial crisis of 2008. Additionally, Qatar has recently invested an unprecedented oil revenue budget in bringing the World Championship Football to the small Arab emirate in 2022.

Although many do not deny the existence of the concept of “conspicuous investment”, one can argue that the comic, Orientalist figure of the wealthy oil sheikh, with his thousand-and-one night palaces and lavish cars, has disappeared. In this context, Sayigh notes that after a few years of wasteful confusion in the oil countries, careful procedures were developed for assigning revenues to capital and current expenditures. Huge infrastructural projects have been undertaken in transport, communications, power, irrigation, land reclamation, housing, urban facilities, education and health – all of which have helped to consolidate the economic base.

While I do not contest that attempts have been made to create more diversified domestic economies in the realisation that oil resources may ultimately be depletable and to cope with the changing panorama of energy sources, Sayigh’s observation should by no means be generalised. Although efforts have been made by governments to sensibly manage the impressive flow of oil revenues, problems of misspending, overspending and overconsumption are not a manifestation of the past. True, Kuwait has been blazing a trail for sensible domestic oil revenue investment through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). During the past three decades, the country has more or less found a balance in allocating equal portions of its income to three areas: domestic development, regional development and foreign investment. Dubai, on the other hand, has played the role of the golden child of the Emirates for the past two decades, massively investing in urban development, the expansion of industry, infrastructure, and the modernisation of transportation. The government’s decision to diversify from a trade-based, oil-reliant economy to one that is service and tourism-orientated has made property more valuable. A longer-term assessment of Dubai’s property market, however, showed depreciation. Some properties lost as much as 64% of their value from 2001 to November 2008.

Dubai’s property market experienced a major downturn in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the slowing economic climate and when by early 2009 the situation had worsened due to the global economic crisis, the emirate was faced with an $80 billion debt due to overspending, and was forced to seek financial help from other emirates. Although Dubai’s intentions are noble to invest in creating a diversified economy, not solely reliant on oil, unwise spending policies are not a manifestation of the past.

2.      Political consequences of the oil effect

Aside from the financial challenges oil extraction has brought countries of the Arabian peninsula, one can put this in the perspective of two extremes: on one hand, the Arab oil states have enjoyed stability, continuity and wealth to a degree unknown since the 1950s. On the other hand, the glaringly uneven distribution of resources among the various sectors of the population has provoked anger and frustration. Furthermore the rising social status and self-awareness of the middle class and its low political status, combined with unemployment, has created a breeding ground for Islamism, although there is by no means an exclusive link between oil exports and the rise of militant Islam.

The one significant political development noticeable during the oil decade is the decline of the ideal of Arab unity and Pan-Arab solidarity. Since the 1950s, Pan-Arabism is on the decline, with the occasional flicker of revival during the Arab-Israeli conflict. In general, revenues from oil have exacerbated the differences in the economic conditions of the Arab states, particularly between the sparsely inhabited oil states of the Arabian peninsula and the densely populated countries of the Nile Valley.

By the late 1970s, a deepening economic gap had opened between the populations on either side of the Red Sea – that of the Nile Valley and that of the Arabian Peninsula. Its impact was considerable, and meant among other things a weakening of the forces calling for Arab unity while it favoured the territorial Arab nation-states. In addition, the failure of Nasserism and its view on Pan-Arabism weakened Egypt’s ideological opposition to the existence of separate Arab states. Unwillingly, Egypt was forced to turn to Arab oil producers for aid.

However, the decline of Pan-Arabism is no exclusive international phenomenon. Even domestically it can be disruptive to a harmonious feeling of unity. Despite the United Arab Emirates’ increased sharing of the oil wealth with the poorer, non-oil sheikhdoms through the confederation government, the contrasts in wealth have continued to underscore the urgent hope of the have-not rulers of Ajman, Fujayrah, Ra’s al-Khaymah, and Umm al-Qaywayn that it would be only a matter of time before they, too, became oil producers. Alledgedly these contrasts have been the root of many political differences between the rulers. In this light, the hope that an oil discovery on its territory was imminent was the main reason for Ra’s al-Khaymah to delay joining the U.A.E. until February 1972. And so, oil and the hope of prospective oil wealth became an obstacle for Pan-Arabism, both internationally and domestically.

3.      Oil and Islam: a breeding ground for political polarisation?

Islamism today is a universal phenomenon in the Muslim world. Therefore the mere hypothesis of a strict connection between oil and Islamism is too far-fetched. It is by no means an exclusive phenomenon of oil exporting countries. Even the study of potential links between oil exports and the rise of Islam remains empirically difficult.

When we do shine a light on Islamist movements in oil exporting countries, it becomes clear that they represent both a social revolt as well as an assertion of cultural and national identity in the wake of an unsuccessful or incomplete modernisation based on oil. Rapid population growth, immature and unstructured political systems where ageing leaders stay in power without accountability to the public, and the autocratic nature of these political systems have been known to create social and generational tensions. Many Muslim countries have old rulers, who control the government and have a firm grip on the economic surplus. Often they also tend to represent Western ideas and lifestyles to a considerable extent. Opposition to them is a frustrated middle generation and especially an impoverished, unemployed youth – no surprise there in context of the recent Arab Spring. They want influence, prosperity and to assert cultural traditions against Western influence. Such a stereotype may be particularly relevant to the oil exporting Muslim countries. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the United Arab Emirates was identified as a major financial center used by al-Qaeda in transferring money to the hijackers. Moreover, two of the 9/11 hijackers who were part of the group that crashed United Flight 175 into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, were UAE citizens.

Unequal leaps of development in the Middle East, often based on oil revenues, have accentuated social and economic inequalities, as I have mentioned earlier. The issue here can be described as being three-fold: it is social, concerning the distribution of income, wealth and power; cultural and national, concerning political and personal identity; and generational, affecting conflicts of power between age groups with different experiences and expectations.

However, oil exports appear to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the rise of Islamism. If they were a necessary condition, Islamism would not have been present in non-exporting oil countries such as Sudan, Lebanon or Palestine. If they were a sufficient condition, oil exports alone would have provoked a strong surge of Islamism in, for instance, Kuwait. When it comes to the 9/11 hijackers, it probably was a mere coincidence that both men had the UAE nationality, although al-Qaeda has been known to frown upon the “ emerati wastefulness” and splurging lifestyle. But a direct causal link between oil exports and Islamism would be indirect and highly complex. As an alternative, authors such as Noreng suggest three sensible reasons for possible links between oil and Islamism. First of all, when oil revenues decline, the public sector suffers from diminishing resources and a frustrated private sector emerges. Secondly, declining oil revenues in an undiversified economy leave young people with reduced changes and disappointment. And thirdly, there is a ripple effect from the oil exporters to the non-oil exporters. When oil revenues rise, the rich oil exporters employ labour from the non-oil exporting countries of the region. They in turn remit money home and increase the GNP of their home country. When oil revenues decline, foreign workers lose jobs, go home and remittances diminish. This way, religion creates an escape and an outlet for frustrations. It is however important to mention that the sole combination of misery and mosques does not by itself produce Islamist movements. Islam’s social promise has to be elaborated, interpreted and presented by a conscious elite able to influence the masses and propagate Islamism to the people.

The social task of Islam focuses precisely on an equal distribution of wealth through the zakat, the wealth tax, which has become an imperative duty for devout Muslims. The specific purpose of the wealth tax is to prevent the rise of any rentier class in the economic system. The specific problem of oil is that it creates an influx of rentier income. Oil provides much money without much effort. In a Middle Eastern context, oil seems to have produced a special political system, based on the centralisation of petroleum revenues within the state. Here, the state is the distributor of economic rent and favours instead of being a tax collector and redistributor. Rulers tend to hand out selective privileges, financed by oil revenues, against loyalty and support from a large private sector. This way, political loyalty is exchanged for economic favours. This is the basis of a classic rentier state. Islamic economic principles can be used to fight or prevent the rise of a rentier class within a state. The problem with oil revenues for Islam is that they differ qualitatively from productive income, because they have their origin in the extraction of a finite resource, not in human labour and productivity: it is “easy” money. When wasteful consumption above reasonable needs goes hand in hand with mismanagement of income distribution and wealth, Islamism may once again find a breeding ground in these rentier states, drawing back upon Islamic economic principles, such as the zakat.

 4.      What role has oil played in the Libyan crisis?

Libya’s petroleum sector has been critical in shaping its political economy. Although Libya ranks 17th among global oil exporters, its 46.4 billion proven oil reserves are the largest in Africa – practically the size of Nigeria and Algeria combined. Over the decades this sector has provided significant resource inflows for Gaddafi. Oil revenues laid the foundation for the establishment of the Libyan rentier state, where rents from natural resources rather than domestic productivity were the backbone for economic growth. The rentier state in Libya was responsible for mass unemployment and poverty since the vast majority of Libyans without access to oil rents hardly benefitted from the country’s wealth, while Gaddafi and his cronies distributed oil wealth via a highly exclusive patronage network and the “republic of the people” effectively eviscerated opposition politicians.

As the dominoes started falling across North Africa, it was only a matter of time before unrest spilled over in Libya. However, Libya was different from Tunisia and Egypt. Without a history of opposition activity, the rebellion has been poorly coordinated and clear leaders were hard to identify. The patronage system appeared to be strong and those benefitting from Gaddafi’s largesse were quick to rally to his side in the initial stages. Moreover, Libya’s patronage system was highly liquid, as evidenced by the more than $60 billion government deposits in local banks – an astounding 99% of Libya’s GDP. By comparison, lending to the private sector only accounted for 11% of its GDP, underlying the rentier characteristics of Libya’s political economy.

5.      Arab petrodiplomacy: a double-edged weapon

The concept of oil as a diplomatic weapon and means for psychological warfare is as old as the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. Especially during the 1967 six-day Arab-Israeli war, Middle East oil became even more important as a diplomatic weapon to the oil-exporting Arab nations due to the fact that oil had almost entirely replaced the use of coal since 1965. However, the use of oil as a diplomatic weapon by the Arab nations against the West has its pitfalls. Applying diplomatic pressure through oil embargoes has mainly missed its primary target, since the United States has remained virtually unaffected by them.  Before the oil weapon could cause irreparable damage to the American economy in the 1973 oil crisis, the oil embargo was quickly eased. The early lifting of the embargo was driven by economic impulses that a major recession in America would affect the entire world adversely. Moreover, the oil embargo of 1973 has paradoxically strengthened the American position in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia. American oil companies, such as Aramco, are still making high profits and continue to operate in the region.

6.      Conclusion

Whether we are discussing the pitfalls of Arab petrodiplomacy,  the intricate task of sensibly managing oil revenues, the dangers of becoming a breeding ground for Islamist groups or the rise of the rentier state, oil-rich nations of the Arabian peninsula and beyond have been confronted with numerous challenges. Although the possibilities oil and its revenues can provide seem endless, they are nothing but a curse in disguise. There are still huge challenges to face when it comes to creating sensible spending policies, managing budgetary controls, keeping overconsumption in check but above all, an equal distribution of wealth. Still too often oil revenues are used solely to aggrandise private fortunes. More efforts should be made to create diversified economies, expand the private sector and ensure that oil revenues are reinvested in domestic development programmes. Development, to mean anything at all, must include the development of the productive capacities of the people themselves, and this is only partly promoted by the provision of transport facilities, factories, buildings and other infrastructure. The receipt of foreign revenues – money – does not in itself improve the capacities of people, a common mistake which oil-rich Middle Eastern countries have often made. This is what we can call absorptive capacity: beyond a certain level, no increase in the availability of capital or other direct inputs can influence the rate of development if a country lacks the social, institutional, and political capacities to utilise increased capital, labour, and natural resources.

References

  • Ali, Sheikh R., 1987. Oil and Power: Political Dynamics in the Middle East. London: Pinter Publishers
  • Anthony, John Duke, 1975. The Impact of Oil on Political and Socioeconomic Change in the United Arab Emirates. In J.D. Anthony, ed. 1975. The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Development. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, Ch. 4.
  • Armitstead, Louise, 2008. Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah sees prices fall as crunch moves in. London: The Daily Telegraph (20 November 2008).
  • Gilbar, Gad G., 1997. The Middle East Oil Decade and Beyond: Essays in Political Economy. London: Frank Cass & Co LTD.
  • Licklider, Roy, 1988. The Oil Weapon in Theoretical Context. In R. Licklider, ed. 1988. Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon. London: University of California Press, Ch. 1
  • Licklider, Roy, 1988. The “Lessons” of the Oil Weapon for Theory and Policy. In R. Licklider, ed. 1988. Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon. London: University of California Press, Ch. 7
  • Loutfi, Muhammed, 1975. Prospects for Development and Investment For Oil Producing Countries. In J.D. Anthony, ed. 1975. The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Development. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, Ch. 4.
  •  Noreng, Øystein, 1997. Oil and Islam: Social and Economic Issues. Chichester, West Sussex (UK): John Wiley & Sons LTD
  • Penrose, Edith, 1975. International Oil Companies and Governments in the Middle East. In J.D. Anthony, ed. 1975. The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Development. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, Ch. 1.
  • Said Zahlan, Rosemarie, 1999. The Making of Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. New York: Ithaca Press
  • Sayigh, Yusif A., 1975. Oil in Arab Developmental and Political Strategy: an Arab View. In J.D. Anthony, ed. 1975. The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Development. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, Ch. 2.
  •  Stocking, George W., 1970. The Economics of Middle East Oil Pricing: Costs, Prices, Profits and Revenues. In G.W. Stocking, 1970. Middle East Oil. Tennessee: Kingsport Press, Inc., Ch. 21
  • Tempest, Paul, 1993. The Politics of Middle East Oil. London: Graham & Trotman Limited

 

Life After Gaddafi – The Future of Foreign Intervention

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In this article, the author assesses the precedent of Libya in foreign intervention after the death of Muammar Gaddafi. In a world in which there are now increased calls for intervention and isolationism the case of Libya is being presented as both an example of a successful intrusion and a reason to reform the UN Security Council. Military capabilities and the tensions within NATO may act as a check to the boisterous rhetoric in the wake of Gaddafi’s death but the key lesson may be the message it has sent to those who are still clinging to power.

By Jack Hamilton, 23 Oct, 2011

Today the Libyan transnational government has declared national liberation before a triumphant crowd in Benghazi, the city where the fight against Gaddafi began.

There are scenes of jubilation in Libya and NATO offices around the world.  Muammar Gaddafi is dead and attentions are now turning to the future of the Maghreb state and the implications of NATO’s intervention in the broader Arab Spring.  In such a celebratory atmosphere what will be the future response to rebellious populations rising up against murderous rulers?

Libya and the Future of Intervention

Nicolas Sarkozy has already made a direct comparison between the conflict in Libya and the plight of the people of Syria in facing down the armies of Bashar al-Assad.  He mused that “The best thing I can do is dedicate our visit to Tripoli to those who hope that Syria can one day also be a free country”.  The Obama Administration has toed a similar line in their policy of ‘Leading from Behind’ by touting the example of Libya as a framework for future interventions.

Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications Ben Rhodes stated that the Libya experience would provide the basis for future interventions with emphasis placed on the need for regime change to be based upon “indigenous political movements” rather than the ambitions of the United States and the importance of “burden sharing” amongst other nations.  The problem is that this does not fit into the model for preventing atrocities which the United States advocated so heavily in the 1990s.  In London and Paris there is talk of prevention and the need to take the lead while the US, perhaps due to domestic constraints, is taking up a more isolationist tone.  The question must therefore be asked if the example of Libya may hinder rather than assist future responses.

Military Capability

The first issue that must be addressed is military capability.  Don’t be distracted by the rhetoric of ‘no boots on the ground’, Libya was a huge military intervention.  The British and the French with help from the Norwegians and Danes, carried out the bulk of the airstrikes and provided the machinery to carry out the naval blockade.  This does not mean that the US should be discounted.  It was American air and sea forces that opened the intervention with decisive attacks on Libyan air bases allowing the European forces to act with greater freedom.  Specific American military capabilities in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance were key to the success to say nothing of the supplies of munitions that were supplied to the European forces.  The lasting images of the war will be of the final rebel push on Tripoli but it is the heavy NATO influence which will resonate in international relations.

A Frayed Alliance

The second impact is the increased tensions between the NATO powers.  Germany’s foreign minister hinted at an early stage that the country would refuse to take sides and eventually abstained from the vote on Security Council Resolution 1973.  The French have long advocated a reform of NATO and the obvious north/south European divide in capabilities has intensified this call.  Whether the military alliance is now in a position to oversee another campaign is debatable.

‘You Break It, You Own It’

NATO leaders have frequently referenced the ‘lessons of Iraq’ when discussing Libya.  The opposition of the National Transitional Council to any foreign troops in a post-war Libya has been welcomed by Western powers hesitant to adopt an increased military role in a time of economic uncertainty.  In this sense there has been a strong adherence to Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn mantra: ‘You Break It, You Own It’.

The Future of Intervention

So what will the lasting impact of the Libyan intervention be?  Crucially, both Britain and France seem to perceive the situation to have been an anomaly.  A nation with a small population and a weak military on the doorstep of Europe with regional actors who were unlikely to support the dictator.  It was seen as an easy case.  Additionally, the Western powers insisted on gaining the support of both the Arab League and the Security Council before intervening.  It is difficult to see such a situation emerging elsewhere in the Arab Spring and Russia has already blocked tentative discussions regarding Syria.

The question of Syria has been largely ignored in Washington.  Syrian opposition is increasingly turning to armed response with army defections burgeoning and calls for international intervention increasing.  People are being gunned down in the streets as the ‘liberators’ of Libya struggle to find the words to escape the precedent they have set.  It is unimaginable that international forces would enter Syria for a variety of reasons.  For that reason Libya must be viewed as an anomaly, not a precedent.

Reforming the Security Council?

Another impact of the intervention has been the rallying of non-interventionist states.  China, Brazil, South Africa and India have not been slow to point out the hypocrisy of the Security Council in elevating its own role while using the mandate of protecting civilians.  Perhaps the lasting message of Libya in international relations will be the claim these nations have demanded for many years: a reform of the Security Council.

Bloody Sheet, Noose, Cage or Condo?

The final message of the conflict in Libya is to those clinging to power in other nations.  It is a message to the Assads and Salehs of the world.  Like Gaddafi or Hussein they can go out on a bloody sheet or at the end of a rope.  Mubarak and Milosevic wound up in cages.  Ben Ali stepped aside amid violent persuasion and now resides comfortably in a condo in Saudi Arabia.  The bloody sheet, the rope, the cage or the condo?

What’s in a Name? Everything, if your name is Nakoshi

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In this article, the author explores a regressive custom in rural India, where parents give unwanted names to their children because of the prevalent sexism, misogyny and castesim.

By Siddharth Singh, 23 Oct, 2011

22nd October, 2011 is an important date for the 265 girls from the rural Indian province of Satara. This was the day they were given a new name, a new identity, and hopefully a new life of dignity.

In 2007, the health officials in this region discovered a rampant practice in Satara where parents would name their girl children ‘Nakoshi’, which means ‘unwanted’, in the hope that their next child would be a boy. Consequentially, these girls would grow to live in a world where they would be stigmatized and discriminated against, more often than women already are.

On 22nd October this year, the administration organised a public event and renamed the girls. The girls were allowed to choose any name they wished, or select one from a list provided. The girls went ahead and chose names such as Aishwaria (meaning ‘wealth’). The Indian Express reported that these girls claimed that for the first time in their lives felt ‘loved and accepted’. They recounted how they were previously treated with disdain, and would often return from their schools crying because they were bullied.

Such practices, however, are not localised to the district of Satara. This happens to be symptomatic of the preference of the girl child by parents across most regions of India. While the average sex ratio of the world is 101 males to 100 females, it stands at 112 males to 100 females in India.  In certain areas, such as the city of Chandigarh, it stands at 123 to every 100. Such a skewed sex ratio has resulted from the practice of female foeticide (the abortion of the female foetus), which is rampant in India.

What is important to note, however, is that female foeticide is not a rural-poor phenomenon only. Studies show that this practice is relatively more rampant in urban areas and in the middle and upper class wealthy families rather than the poorer ones. One of the possible causes of this is that the poor cannot afford the sex determinatation tests and abortion procedures.

The poor are hence left with venting their frustration of not having a male child by adopting practices such as naming and shaming the girls who are already born.

However, the practice of giving children such names is not only determined by gender: such practices are common along caste lines too. In fact, it may well be the case that it is more prevalent by caste.

In rural India, casteism is expressed in a more violent and unabashed way than in urban India. Every year, hundreds, if not thousands of people from the ‘lowest’ castes are killed by the ‘higher’ castes. While accurate statistics of this are not readily available, evidence of such a high number can be observed in the daily reports of such killings in national and regional newspapers. The triggers of such violence is usually the ‘lowest’ castes ‘daring’ to assert their equality in the society, such as by entering temples where the ‘highest’ castes frequent, or using communal wells for water which the ‘lowest’ castes are forbidden to do.

An example of such brutality can be seen in this short documentary.

One of the outcomes of such violence is the naming of children of the ‘lowest’ castes as the regional-language equivalents of ‘dirt’, ‘garbage’, ‘filth’, ‘fool’, ‘stupid’, etc. Some parents do so willingly in order to prevent their children or the parents themselves from being beaten up or killed by the ‘upper’ castes for having names that they use on their own children.

This results in these children getting discriminated at every turn in their lives. It becomes difficult to find meaningful employment or be treated as equals. Their caste becomes apparent the moment they introduce themselves, so they aren’t even given an opportunity to prove themselves anywhere.

I have personally witnessed such a case in rural Rajasthan. A young man in his twenties who had good bachelors and masters degrees could not find employment in any private company in his district in spite of being more qualified than most other people across castes. This man had, after all, committed the ‘crime’ of being born in the ‘wrong’ family.

It is time regional administrations from around India made serious attempts to identify such cases and reverse this trend just as the Satara administration did in the case of the ‘Nakoshis’. Importantly, these children must be given caste-neutral surnames too. In doing so, they would be doing a lot to reduce the inequalities and injustices that have been thrust upon them.

The Shakespearean quote from Romeo and Juliet, ‘What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet’ unfortunately does not hold true everywhere.

The author can be followed on Twitter @siddharth3 

Farewell to Nuclear Weapons or the Failure of Civilisation

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In this article, the author praises Mikhail Gorbachev for his renewed call for nuclear disarmament and discusses some of the myths surrounding nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Drawing on psychology and psychoanalysis he concludes that denial is making us accomplices of the greatest atrocity known to civilisation.

By David J. Franco, 20 Oct, 2011

This morning I read Mikhail Gorbachev’s renewed call for nuclear disarmament. In his article A Farewell to the Nuclear Sword of Damocles former USSR President and artifice of the Perestroika warns that ‘by failing to propose a compelling plan for nuclear disarmament, the US, Russia, and the remaining nuclear powers are promoting through inaction a future in which nuclear weapons will inevitably be used’. As much as I was happy to read that Gorbachev is determined to continue the job he started as a man of power, I experienced a mixture of unhappiness and distaste upon reading the following commentary left by one of the readers:

‘The genie is out of the bottle, and cannot be put back inside.

Nuclear weapons ended WWII and kept the world from WWIII. So long as nations have these weapons, there will not be another World War. The presence of these arms has saved millions of lives. For example, they maintain the relative peace between India and Pakistan – because neither one wants to be bombed. I hope, really hope, that they will never be used, and that there will come a time when they are not needed or present.

As long as humankind insists on not living together in peace, these weapons are needed. I see little hope of changing human nature in the near term.’

Unhappiness and distaste, indeed, for the above analysis is misguiding at its best. Arguing that nuclear weapons are the sole reason for which the world has not lived a third world war is misleading and lacks scientific rigor. The great powers went through their longest period of peace between 1815 and 1914 (with the permission of the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian exchange) when neither nuclear weapons nor United Nations existed as yet. Lessons from the past and, more plausibly, utilitarian calculations may be more at the core of why the world has not known a third world war. Further, the presence of these weapons, and their only use to this day, caused thousands of instant deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese army had been defeated by the time those weapons were dropped which means that the decision responded more to the need to announce the world who the new boss was. Hence, rather than saving millions of lives nuclear weapons have the honour to have caused the largest number of deaths at once in the history of human warfare. They also hold the record for bringing the greatest level of suffering to a non-combatant population during and after (many years after) the dropping of the bombs – you may want to read statements of survivorsor watch the acclaimed BBC film Threads.

Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are said to be the reason for the relative peace between India and Pakistan, or the US and the USSR for the same matter. To demonstrate the contrary is an impossible task for it is impossible to prove something in the negative. However, if anything the existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia increases the security dilemma and exposes the region and the world to greater risk. But of course our commentator knows better and even delights us with his wishful thinking: ‘I hope, really hope, that they will never be used’. Well, for what it matters I do hope that they will never be used and for that reason I do hope that they are eliminated.

One of the greatest obstacles in the quest to eliminate nuclear weapons is said to be what in psychological or psychoanalytical terms is known as denial. Denial to accept the inner destructiveness of human beings in general and, more specifically, denial to see that destructiveness in ourselves as much as we can see it in our enemies. For in each of us, individually and collectively, there is as much good as there is evil. There may be multiple interrelated causes for war, amongst which I count political, economic, ethnic, religious, etc. But it is also a fact that human beings are naturally aggressive (of course some are more violent than others but all may become equally violent under certain circumstances). In short, regardless of whether life and death instincts clash with one another permanently, or whether necrophilious instincts take over only when love for life fails, the fact is that each of us, with no exception, is capable of the best and of the worst. The Russians weren’t worse than the Americans, and the Americans weren’t better than the Russians. For there is only one human race, not two –the good and the bad–, as many want us believe.

Nuclear deterrence policies are said to be rational and to fail only when dealing with irrational leaders or terrorists. Two things need be said in relation to this. First, there is nothing rational when a nation is defended with the most (self)destructive weapons ever created by man. Not even Tilly’s theory of war makes states, assuming such theory is valid, holds sway when all that is left after a nuclear explosion is a pile of debris and millions of dead in an inhospitable land. State leaders and terrorists seem equally irrational in light of this –plus so far only leaders have dropped a nuclear bomb. Second, nuclear deterrence policies can only make sense in the event that mankind’s inner destructiveness is denied or disregarded. Man has fought wars since the start and it will likely continue to fight wars until the end. International cooperation and norms can tame behavior and arguably, only arguably, change state interests. A change in the superstructure may also arguably help outlaw human competition. But as long as men have nuclear weapons at hand ready to be launched civilisation will continue to see the word failure each time it looks at itself in the mirror. For we do not need another nuclear explosion to confirm that we have failed. Civilization is already failing.

In a sense I am relieved that the author of the above commentary leaves denial aside to acknowledge mankind’s inner (self)destructiveness. What on the contrary puzzles me is that despite this, or because of this, he/she is led to conclude that nuclear weapons are necessary in order to maintain peace. The answer to this problem, he/she argues, is not to eradicate nuclear weapons but to eradicate war from the face of the earth. But because man is violent and will always be, war will always prevail and nuclear weapons will always be needed to maintain peace in the absence of better means. Against the argument that man will always fight wars because of its inner violence one may say that social conclusions cannot always be derived from biological conditions. Those who argue that may indeed have a point. But that is not the point. The key question here is: should we continue to allow the existence of nuclear weapons ad eternum? Even if we were to assume that it has worked in the past, are we fully certain that nuclear deterrence will always work in the future? If not, are the effects of a nuclear exchange something the world can afford? My view is that none of these questions can be answered in the positive. Nuclear deterrence will not always work and the effects of a nuclear exchange (there cannot exist such a thing as limited nuclear exchange) are not something civilisation can afford.

I am too young to have lived the nuclear anxiety of the Cold War years, but I am old enough to observe that such anxiety, although not particularly manifest in the West these days, can make a comeback any second. It only takes a renewed crisis or a change in the international order to revert the current situation. Note that I do not discuss here the possibility of a nuclear explosion caused by miscalculation or accidental use because this short article addresses mainly the contents of the commentary noted above. But miscalculation and/ or accidental use, too, can take place any minute and the effects of that happening will be as equally devastating as a nuclear exchange. Because, believe me, just as it is a matter of time before a state or terrorist cell uses a nuclear bomb, it is also a matter of time before one is dropped accidentally. The great powers have a duty to lead and to fulfill their obligations in accordance to international law including their obligation to disarm as per article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As long as they do not work together towards that goal, leaving aside irrational notions of power and prestige, the world will continue to see the emergence of new wanna-be proliferators. In a purely Orwellian fashion, history gets rewritten and those who are friends today can easily become enemies tomorrow. Memory too gets erased easily and it seems that not many today in the West remember what it was like to live under the threat of a nuclear exchange. I do not blame them for not remembering but I do blame them for not wanting to remember. When something has not been sorted it cannot be left ignored as if the problem did not exist in the first instance. Denial is the most dangerous of all self-defence mechanisms. Whether we like it or not, it is automatically making us accomplice of the worst atrocity facing civilization: its own failure.

Iranian-American Relations: Explaining the Recent Allegations against Iran

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US agents state that a "significant terrorist act" linked to Iran which would have included the assassination of the Saudi US ambassador Adel al-Jubeir (seen here seated with former US First Lady Laura Bush and King Abdullah) has been foiled recently.In this article, the author argues that the recent allegations against Iran have been largely shaped by America’s perceptions of, and prejudices against Iran, which were shaped by the changes in their relations post-1979.

By Aryaman Bhatnagar, 19 Oct, 2011

The most recent American allegations against Iran accusing it of plotting the assassination of the Saudi Ambassador in Washington and the Iranian dismissal of such allegations as being baseless have once again revealed the endless cycle of blame that characterises Iranian-American relations. This latest round of allegations and subsequent denials originates from the perception that America has of Iran.

The Quds Force (QF), a special branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps has been accused by the United States of America and Saudi Arabia to have been part of the plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to Washington. However, Iran’s alleged complicity in this plot has met with strong scepticism within the diplomatic community and from foreign analysts specialising in Iran. Moreover, the lack of evidence to indict the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini or the Revolutionary Corps in this plot does not help America’s claims. Despite this, the Americans are adamant that the plot had been sanctioned by the QF or directly by Khameini himself. The Americans are calling upon the international community to strengthen sanctions against Iran and have not completely ruled out the military option as retaliation for Iran’s “flagrant violation of international law”.

This has not been the first time that Iran has been accused by the Americans without any concrete evidence. Iran had been accused of bombing the American embassy in Beirut in 1983 and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, which was home to American troops at that point. Years of investigation failed to prove Iranian involvement but even this has failed to dispel American suspicions, who continue to believe otherwise. Similarly, Iran has been accused of providing aid to al-Qaeda and the Taliban in order to destabilise American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although, there has been evidence to suggest that Iranian weapons have been used by insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan, there is nothing to prove that this is part of a deliberate policy. However, such allegations have been used by America to exclude Iran from all the major projects concerning the region.

The reasons for the continuous demonization of Iran in America can be traced back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, a watershed for American-Iranian relations. The revolution changed the image of Iran from a modern ‘westernised’ ally of America to one of America’s most formidable foes in the Middle East, which was ruled by ‘Mad Mullahs’. The Islamic Republic’s use of ideology in its foreign policy and an alternate vision for the world social and political order were seen as a threat to the American-led world order. It was the hostage crisis of 1979, which shaped the image of Iran as an irrational actor and left a lasting impact on the American impression of the Islamic Republic. From this date onwards, Iran became synonymous with worldwide terrorism and the source of all evil. Thus, irrespective of where terrorism was committed, the finger was automatically pointed at Iran. Even if there was lack of evidence, it was assumed to be something that Iran was capable of doing and were, thus, condemned for it.

Such a negative perception of Iran has become institutionalised in the political culture of America. As a result, the US policymakers have found it extremely difficult to shed their prejudices against. This is most evident in case of America’s response to Iran’s nuclear programme. Although, there is strong evidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is meant for peaceful purposes, America is convinced that it is meant to cause harm to them. A nuclear weapon in the hands of religious fanatics is believed to be dangerous for the entire world. It is interesting to note that America had been instrumental in starting the nuclear programme in Iran prior to the occurrence of the revolution. Their paranoia then clearly is an outcome of their perception of the nature of the Iranian regime than the actual dangers posed by the nuclear weapons.

The US’ differences with Iran are also motivated by their different strategic interests as both want to establish their primacy over the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, USA’s alliance with Israel and the bitter Iran-Israel relations also act as an obstacle for normalising the Iranian-American relations. But USA has managed to work around such issues and resolve its differences in the past with other countries. It is the perpetuation of the perception of Iran as an inherently anti-American nation, which is always looking for an opportunity to subvert them that has not only prevented USA from reconciling with Iran but also encourages speculations about its intentions.

Does It Get Better?

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By Matthias Pauwels, 18 Oct, 2011

The year 1998 was not only dominated by the saga of Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, but also saw the horrific hate crime murder of University of Wyoming student Matthew Shephard on grounds of his sexual orientation. On the night of October 6-7, Shephard got offered a ride home by Aaron McKinney and Russell Henderson. In sharp contrast to their good Samaritan offer, McKinney and Henderson subsequently drove the car to a remote, rural area in Laramie, Wyoming. Shephard was allegedly tortured for several hours and was finally tied to a fence, leaving him to die. Still alive but in a coma, Matthew Shephard was discovered 18 hours later by a cyclist. Having experienced severe brain-stem damage, Shephard never regained consciousness and passed away on October 12, 1998.

At trail, McKinney offered various rationales to justify his actions, ranging from the gay panic defense embedded in alleged sexual advances made by Shephard to involuntary manslaughter. The prosecution alleged that both men had pretended to be gay to gain Shephard’s trust. The testimony of Chastity Pasley and Kristen Price, girlfriends of McKinney and Henderson, came as a judicial drive-by-shooting for the two, claiming that both perpetrators had plotted beforehand to rob a gay man. In 1999 McKinney and Henderson received two consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole.

The Legislative Struggle of the Hate Crimes Protection Act

The United States 1969 federal hate-crime law encompassed crimes motivated by actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin, and only applicable when the victim is engaging in a federally-protected activity. In 1990, United States Congress passed the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, allowing the government to count the incidence of hate crimes based on religion, race, national origin, and sexual orientation. However, a clause was added to the end of the bill stating that federal funds should not be used to “promote or encourage homosexuality”.

However, the murders of Matthew Shephard and 15-year-old Lawrence King – who was shot and killed in February 2008 by 14-year-old Brandon McInerney who he’d asked to be his Valentine – , and the endless string of gay teenagers committing suicide was living proof that gay and lesbian youth are particularly prone to physical and mental victimization. There was a dire need of expanding the 1969 federal hate-crime law to include crimes motivated by a victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.

The passing of the Matthew Shephard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act proved to be an epic legislative battle in the American Congress. The bill, first introduced in the 107 Congress’s House of Representatives in 2001, drew specific criticism from American Evangelicals, with the evangelical off-shoot lobbying group Focus on the Family as a prominent force against strengthening federal hate-crimes legislation, stating that “it would muzzle people of faith who dared to express their moral and biblical concerns about homosexuality”.

After having died in Congress three consecutive times, the bill was reintroduced in 2007, this time with a clause adding gender identity to the list of suspect classes for prosecution of hate crimes. When the bill finally passed in Congress and proceeded to the United States Senate, many Republicans got in gear to make sure the Matthew Shephard Act never saw the legislative light of day. After having met its match a first time in the Senate, the bill was reintroduced as an amendment to the Senate Defense Reauthorization Bill (H.R.1585). Although the vote had been put briefly on hold after Republicans staged a filibuster on a possible troop-withdrawal amendment to the Defense Bill, the Matthew Shephard Act did finally pass in the Senate in September 2007 after a six-year-long legislative tour de force. However, as a dispiriting deus ex machina President Bush indicated that he would veto the Defense Bill if it reached the Oval Office with the hate-crimes legislation attached. Ultimately the amendment was dropped, nullifying six years of legislative struggle to expand the federal hate-crimes law incorporating gender identity and sexual orientation.

The Obama administration brought new hopes to those on the barricades for expanding the existing federal hate-crimes law. In a post-Bush era, President Obama communicated that one of the goals of his new administration was to see the Matthew Shephard Act pass. After it was reintroduced in Congress in April 2009, it sparked a feisty debate amongst Representatives, with Rep. Virginia Foxx stating that Matthew Shephard’s death was merely a hoax to further the gay agenda. Despite Republican claims that federal law was already sufficient to prevent hate crimes, the bill reached the Senate in the same month. The Matthew Shephard Act was adopted as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act and passed in the Senate in July 2009. Eleven years after the brutal murder of Matthew Shephard, the bill was signed into law on October 28, 2009 by President Obama.

Efficacy of the Matthew Shephard Act

In May 2011, a man in Arkansas pled guilty under the Act for running a car containing five Hispanic men off the road. As a result, he became the first person ever convicted under the new Act. In August 2011, one man pled guilty to branding a swastika into the arm of a developmentally disabled man of Navajo descent. The aforementioned crimes were framed under the Matthew Shephard Act on grounds of hate crimes based on race.

The expansion of the 1969 United States federal hate-crimes law was framed under the empirical observation that hate crimes are worse than regular crimes without a prejudiced motivation from a psychological perspective. The time it takes to mentally recover from a hate crime is almost twice as long than it is for a regular crime. Especially gay and lesbian people often feel as if they are being punished for their sexuality, which leads to higher incidence of depression, anxiety, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. In the aftermath of the Matthew Shephard murder, many gay youth reported going “back into the closet”, fearing for their safety and experiencing a strong sense of self-loathing embedded in their sexual orientation. 

Earlier aformentioned examples of the Act’s implementation refer to hate crimes based on race. The legislation’s efficacy regarding hate crimes based on sexual orientation has a much lower public exposure rate, and this is exactly where part of the problem still lies. For many gay youth, there is still is huge threshold in reporting victimization based on sexual orientation, embedded in fear of being labeled with a social stigma. Secondly, mental victimization is often suffered alone in silence, and its lack of visibility or understanding can be attributed to the recent suicide death of Buffalo, N.Y., 14-year-old Jamey Rodemeyer, who was bullied online with gay slurs for over a year. Marking a somber beginning to LGBT History Month this October, Rodemeyer’s death is a tragic reminder of the existing vulnerability and marginalization of gay teens. And while a legislative framework such as the Matthew Shephard Act incorporates the corporality of hate crimes, the mental aspect of these crimes based on ethnicity, gender identity, or sexual orientation have proven to be a silent killer which no piece of legislation can easily remedy. The ultimate responsibility here lies with educational systems by installing a protective framework for bullied LGBT students to prevent ostracization.

When the message that is out there claims that being gay equals being a second-class citizen, that message needs to be changed. Matthew Shephard was not a second-class citizen. Lawrence King and Jamey Rodemeyer were not second-class citizens. The Matthew Shephard Act may have given a new dimension to federal hate-crimes law, but doing the same to a social message stating that being gay is threatening, is not something that is easily remedied by any senatorial bill.

In May 2011, after coming out to friends, Jamey Rodemeyer posted a YouTube video on the new online site, It Gets Better Project, which provides testimony from adults and celebrities to reassure victimized and potentially suicidal LGBT youth that life improves as they get older. Jamey wrote: “Love yourself and you’re set… I promise you, it will get better.”

Special Economic Zones in India: The law and the experience

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In this paper, the author analyses the motivation, framework and the socio-economic impact of India’s Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act of 2005.

By Siddharth Singh, 16 Oct, 2011

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have been touted to be magic pills for nations to kick-start exports, develop infrastructure, and increase employment by adhering to the principles of free markets and minimum distortions caused by effective administration and low or no taxes (Tantri, 2010, p26). Owing to the success of China and other countries, India took up the development SEZs with much enthusiasm, but the outcome has not entirely been as desired. On the one hand, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry reports impressive figures to show how SEZs have “worked” (discussed below), but on the other hand, there are cases such as that of Nandigram, West Bengal (The Telegraph, 2007) where 14 people died in March, 2007 while protesting against the establishment of a chemicals hub SEZ by an Indonesian developer (Manoj, 2009, p355 and Dohrmann, 2008, p75).

In an attempt to understand India’s experience with SEZs, this essay will first look into the motivations of setting up SEZs. It will then assess the framework the SEZ Act of 2005, and finally, move on to scrutinise the social and economic impact of this policy.

The Rationale of the SEZ

An SEZ is a geographically delimited area administered by a single body, offering a certain incentive regime to businesses which physically locate within the zone (The World Bank Group, 2008, p2). An Export Processing Zone (EPZ) is a type of SEZ which is legally defined as a “policy enclave” within the host state territory, to which distinct regime of custom and trade regulations apply (Muchlinski, 2007, p226). These policy enclaves are instruments to realise micro and macro-economic, and political objectives. Microeconomic issues include employment generation, while political objectives include implementing regional economic development strategies (Guangwen, 2003, p20).

The SEZ is a subset within the geographical boundaries of the state. The rest of the host state is legally referred to as the Domestic Tariff Area or the DTA (Muchlinski, 2007, p229). Effectively, the SEZ is “outside” the territory of the host state with respect to trade and investment. Figure 1 below explains this relationship.

 Figure 1

The host states can expect inter alia to earn increased export earnings, benefit from increased employment opportunities, improved training and skills, and transfer of modern technology (Muchlinski, 2007, p227). In return, foreign investors are offered incentives such as tax exemptions, duty free imports, exemptions from import quotas, capital mobility to remit profits, export allowances and subsidised interest rates within the SEZ. A significant incentive offered by the host state involves the legal control of labour relations. Specifically, the right to establish trade unions or take industrial action may be limited within the SEZ (Muchlinski, 2007, p229).

Political and economic stability, reliable infrastructure, inexpensive labour, market access, and efficient bureaucracy are factors that determine not only how attractive investors will find the SEZ, but are factors that eventually determine the success of the SEZ (UNIDO, n.d., p27).

Keeping in mind these objectives and demands, India embarked on a journey to use SEZs as engines of economic growth. India set up Asia’s first EPZ set up in Kandla in 1965. The government announced the SEZ policy in April 2000, claiming to “to overcome the shortcomings experienced on account of the multiplicity of controls and clearances; absence of world-class infrastructure, and an unstable fiscal regime and with a view to attract larger foreign investments in India” (SEZ India, 2011a, Introduction). The Foreign Trade Policy provisions governed SEZs in India prior to the implementation of the SEZ Act, 2005 in February, 2006 (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2007).

Salient Features of the SEZ Act (2005)

‘The Special Economic Zones Act, 2005’ was passed on the 23rd June, 2005, in an attempt to give a framework to the implementation of SEZs in India. It includes several regulatory and investment fostering mechanisms.

i. Creation of SEZs and general administration:

The Act explicitly mentions a few guiding principles for the Central Government regarding the creation of SEZs. The objectives of the government, as stated by the Act, must be to generate additional economic activity, promote exports of goods and services, create employment opportunities, and develop infrastructure, all while maintaining the “sovereignty and integrity” of India

(SEZ Act, 2005, p8). Thus, SEZs have thus come to be justified as an engine of growth and employment generation, and not in terms of exports expansion alone (Sharma, 2009, p18).

The Act calls for the creation of the “Board of Approval”, which, as the name suggests, looks into applications to set up SEZs and gives approval to them if they meet the required criteria. This acts as a single-stop-shop for investors (called ‘developers’) to get the required regulatory permission to set up an SEZ. SEZs may be established under this Act either jointly or severally by the Central Government, State Government of any legal person. The Central Government, however, can suo moto set up SEZs, and can prescribe other requirements at a later stage (SEZ Act, 2005, p1-6).

The position of a Development Commissioner is established (p14), and this position is responsible for the general overview of the SEZ, from presiding over the Approval Committee (p17-18) to running the SEZ Authority, which is in charge of provision of infrastructure, promoting exports. reviewing the functioning and performance of the SEZ, and other such functions (p28-29).

ii. Tax Exemptions, Finance and Banking

By definition, SEZs are so-called “tax havens”. The Act specifies all those taxes and duties that the developers would be exempted from in the SEZs. There is exemption from Custom Tariff Act, 1975, Central Excise Act, 1944, Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 and other similar laws (p24). 100% Income Tax exemption on export income for the first 5 years, and 50% for the next 5 years is offered (SEZ India, 2011a, Facilities and Incentives).

Attention is also given to the trade between the SEZ and the DTA. The Act (SEZ Act, 2005, p8) prescribes the exemption from the payment of duties, taxes or cess under all enactments of the First Schedule for trade between DTA to SEZ. However, any goods moved from the SEZ to the DTA would be subject to safeguarding duties, anti-dumping regulations and other instruments (p26).

The Act also specifies the financial governance structure of the SEZ. Bank branches in SEZs, for example, are defined as ‘Offshore Banking Units’ (SEZ Act, 2005, p3-4), and can be set up after the approval of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which is India’s central bank (p20). Other financial activities in the SEZ would be monitored by the relevant regulatory authorities in the DTA (p21).

iii. Law Enforcement

Were illegal activities to take place, the Act states that the Development Commissioner would have the cases investigated, and the cases would be heard at the court(s) appointed by the State Government and the Chief Justice of the state High Court (SEZ Act, 2005, p22). The Act also explicitly states that in case there is any inconsistency of this law with other laws, than this Act would have an overriding effect over others (p34).

iv. Amendments

Over the years, several amendments have been made to the Act. They have primarily revolved around specifying the provision of infrastructure and requirements for establishment of SEZs. The minimum area requirements vary across industries and regions. As an example, a multi-product SEZ has to be between 1000 and 5000 hectares, and at least 50% of the area needs to be earmarked for developing the processing area (SEZ India, 2010, ch II sec. 5, sub-sec 2 a).

Amendments also allow for the generation, transmission and distribution of power within an SEZ (sec. 5, sub-sec 5 c). Importantly, in the case of an information technology related SEZ, 24 hours of uninterrupted power supply is to be provided, apart from reliable connectivity (sec. 5, sub-sec 5A).

Importantly, a stated objective is the generation of positive net foreign exchange earnings, as it is specified that a unit would achieve positive net foreign exchange, calculated cumulatively for a period of five years from production (ch VI sec 53).

The Act is clear in specifying the framework regarding the implementation of an SEZ promotion strategy. The Act however, remains conspicuous in its silence on land acquisition and labour laws, which has become the bone of contention on the implementation of the policy.

A Brief Overview of SEZs in India

Prior to the enactment of the SEZ Act, 2005, there were 19 SEZs across India. The government has now approved 581 SEZs (SEZ India, 2011b) with a further 154 with in-principle approvals (SEZ India, 2011c). 130 of these SEZs are operational today. 283 of the 581 approved SEZs are in the three states if Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (SEZ India, 2011d). Of the sectors, the Information Technology and IT enabled services sector has a 61% share of SEZs, while the biotech, pharma, textile sector and multi-product SEZs have less than 10% share each. Apart from these, there are three airport based multi-product, and eight port-based multi-product SEZs (SEZ India, 2011e).

Source: SEZ India, 2011e

The Indian experience in the implementation of SEZs has brought to light major areas of concern in the economic and social spheres. In the economic sphere, these are related to fiscal costs, net employment generation and exports. The social experience of SEZs has brought up issues of worker rights, and those of land transfer, dispossession and displacement. The next two sections of the paper will look into these briefly.

The Economic Experience

i Fiscal issues and investment:

Tax holidays in the SEZ are generous, and provide 100% exemption for Income Tax on profits for the first 5 years of production and 50% for the next five years, apart from the tax breaks discussed above. In addition to this, land is given by the government to developers at low rates (Dutta, 2009, p23). Estimates by the Finance Ministry show that the losses to the state exchequer in terms of forgone revenue would be £24billion for an investment of £50billion (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2007).

Owing to the perceived lost revenue, the Finance Ministry announced a Minimum Alternate Tax on the book profits of developers and units operating in SEZs in the 2011-12 Budget. The Commerce Ministry, however, wants to see a roll back of this tax and sees SEZs as “engines of growth” (Pannu, 2011). This points to differences between the Finance Ministry and the Commerce Ministry on the issue of SEZs.

In fact, Arunachalam (2010, p25) shows that the investment as of 2009 in approved SEZs stood at £416million, and not the figures cited by the Finance Ministry. He argues (2010, p20) that Indian SEZs failed to attract FDI as it would have liked because firstly, India has not used SEZ policies to test reforms which would later be adopted nationwide; secondly, Indian SEZs are small in size (especially when compared to their Chinese equivalents), and finally, because of the lack of labour market flexibility.

ii. Exports:

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry claimed that the value of exports from functioning SEZs increased from £1.9billion in 2003-04 to £30.6billion in 2009-10 (exchange rate £1 = INR72 as of 16th March, 2011). The growth rate of exports over the previous years increased from 25% before the SEZ Act, 2005 to 52% after its implementation, and it stands at 121.40% in 2009-2010 (SEZ India, 2011a, Export Performances). Note that these figures are inconsistent with the estimates of
losses by the Finance Ministry.

An example of a successful SEZ in this regard would be the Mundra SEZ. This SEZ houses India’s largest private port, has been most successful in seeing an increase in exports. It is expected to handle 100m tonnes of exports by 2013, with a growth rate of 40% in these years (Thakkar, 2008).

However, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has pointed out that most of the SEZs sell goods within the country as “deemed exports” rather than actually exporting them overseas. This seems plausible as the exponential rise of exports from SEZs corresponds with stagnant national exports. The Finance Ministry speculates that some units have merely shifted to these zones from the DTA to avail tax benefits (Pannu, 2011).

Source: SEZ India, 2011a, Export Performances

iii. Employment generation (or the lack thereof):

Proponents of SEZs have claimed that SEZs lead to employment generation, in addition to exports. While the total employment by all types of SEZs across India as of 2008 was about 370,000 (Reddy, Prasad and Kumar, 2010, p87), Mahanta (2010, p199) shows that acquisition of agricultural land by SEZs lead to a fall in food-grain output and agricultural employment. Importantly, he shows that this fall in agricultural employment is not offset by the increase in employment in SEZs.

Another point to note is that compared to countries around the world, Indian SEZs have not seen a high proportion of female workers. In 2003, only 37% of the workforce was female (Varma, Prasad and Krishna, 2010, p320-322). The claims of benefits of the generation of employment by SEZs are hence called into question.

The Social Experience

i. Land acquisition and displacement

Land acquisition is the ‘hot topic’ of India’s SEZ policy. The SEZ Act, 2005 makes no mention of it. The out-dated Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is applicable in this regard. Even the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1998 has come under fire from for several shortcomings. For instance, land losers could have their land acquired even if a stated compensation isn’t paid (Asif, 1999, p1564).

Land acquisition is especially contentious and problematic when the land being acquired is populated with people living off the land, which is often the case with agricultural land, as was the case in Nandigram, West Bengal. In addition to this, Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2007) argue that real-estate developers can engage in major land grab in the guise of setting up SEZs as the SEZ rules require only 25 per cent of the land to be used for industrial processing purposes.

While approved SEZs are to consume 95,000 hectares of land, (Balasubramanian, 2010, p53), the Ministry of Commerce stated that as of 2008, the land allocated to SEZs was about 0.070% of the total land area and 0.128% of the total agricultural area of the country (Reddy, Prasad and Kumar, 2010, p87). While this may seem low, it is has proven to be problematic because of the high population density in some of these areas.

An illustration of the flawed acquisition mechanism by the government would be the case of the state of Andhra Pradesh, where land is being acquired from the poorest people who had been earlier allocated land by the government in “land-for-the-poor schemes”. Legally, this land belongs to the government, so the government takes it back often without compensation on the behalf of SEZ developers (Oskarrsson, 2010, p368).

On the other hand, the Commerce Ministry has cited examples of how rise in land rates in barren, unproductive land has brought wealth to the poor and SEZs have brought infrastructure to the hinterland, as is the case with Mundra in the state of Gujarat (Bhatt, 2007). The wastelands in the coastal regions of Gujarat are mostly owned by the government, hence leaving out land acquisition out of the picture. Moreover, states like Tamil Nadu have seen the rural population welcome SEZs, because several years of social upliftment by the government has made the populace less dependent on agriculture for their livelihood (Murugesan and Bandgar, 2010).

ii. Labour relations

While the SEZ Act, 2005 makes no mention of changes in labour law, Tanwar (2010, p231) writes that changes to the prevailing pattern of application of labour laws have been made in SEZs. All units operating in SEZs are categorised as “Public Utility Service”, meaning that many labour laws become irrelevant. A Public Utility Service is defined to be a service that is of great value to the society, and the lack of provision of which can affect the life of everyone. In this case, employees have to give a 14 day notice before going on strike. Additionally, employees in SEZs don’t have protection in the form of a notice period or compensation against retrenchment. It follows that employees will be reluctant to raise a voice against their employers when the need arises. Moreover, employers in SEZs have the right to change the terms and conditions of service at any point of time. Mahanta (2010, p200) raises concern regarding the lack of labour unions, stating that the possibility of fall in real wages is high, although experience shows that SEZ wages are at par with non-zone wages (Varma, Prasad and Krishna, 2010, p326).

Conclusion

This essay has dealt briefly into a few contentious issues that arise with the establishment of SEZs in India. With significant employment not being generated, and with no real rise in national exports has taken place, the rationale of this establishment is called into question. The issue remains volatile, as was seen in the case of Nandigram, where the conflict continued to simmer after the scrapped its plans to establish the SEZ there (Dohrmann, 2008, p76).

However, governments are unlikely to give up on establishing SEZs, and it is imperative that laws are amended in order to make trade and investment flourish without disempowering the people who are displaced or the workforce in SEZs. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 need to be looked into, and a transparent rehabilitation law needs to be put in place (Dohrmann, 2008, p79). In fact, the people need to be made stakeholders in the progress of the nation. Failure to do so may further prove former Indian Prime Minister VP Singh correct in his assessment of the SEZ policy of India, when he said (Dohrmann, 2008, p1), “the current promotion of SEZs is unjust”, and that it acts as a “trigger for massive social unrest, which may even take the form of armed struggle.”

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References

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    Serials Publications, New Delhi. ISBN 978-81-8387-336-9

The Aryan Debate in the Indian Context

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In this essay, the author analyses the debate surrounding the origin of the Indo-Aryan people who constitute a majority of the population in Northern India. While the traditional view is that the Aryans migrated from outside the subcontinent, a more recent view holds that they were indigenous to the region.

By Rebecca Aranha, 13 Oct, 2011

“The truth of ancient history is indifferent to our wishes, our politics, our religion… the idea of truth in history involves the idea that exists independent of our will, and is therefore difficult to know, because our interpretations are will-bound and our facts are never independent of our theories”  -Thomas R. Trautmann

The Aryan debate, ancient Indian history’s very own case of ‘whodunit’, has been raging in books, newspapers, and public forums of India for the last decade or so. It examines the following question: did the Sanskrit-speaking Aryans enter from the north-west in about 1500 BC, or were they indigenous to India and identical to the people of the Indus Civilization of 2600-1900 BC? This question is central to the debate that has shaped Indian history writing, and has been strongly contested in public discussions for over a decade.

The first position, the immigrant Aryan position that the Aryans came to India from outside in about 1500 BC, is called the standard view because it is the interpretation that has prevailed in schools and university textbooks and in academic journals and books. The second position, the indigenous Aryan position that the Aryans were the makers of Indus Civilisation, is called the alternate view, because it is challenging the established, standard view.

The resolution to the Indo-European controversy has been one of the most consuming intellectual projects for historians of Ancient India of the last two centuries. It has captivated the imagination and dedication of generations of archaeologists, linguists, anthropologists, historians, and many scholarly, and not so scholarly, dilettantes. In modern India, the discussion of Indo-Aryan migration is charged politically and religiously, with the debate having produced a lot of polemics on both sides.

Thus, apart from just being a historical debate, the Aryan debate has now acquired a political and social colour. Moreover, what used to be a debate among scholars has boiled and spilled over into the public arena, and the sober works of academicians are now swamped by the often heated writings of those who are not scholars trained in the history, linguistics and archaeology of ancient India. With such heated debates it becomes easier to be thrown off the track of historical truth in favour of political or religious objectives, thus allowing partisan politics to enter the debate. As may be questioned by many, why has this debate become so highly charged and contentious? In a general manner we may say that the past often becomes very important and debatable as ancient history serves as a character for society and marks its growth and continuance. When there are various visions about the future, it is the past, that sets precedence so to speak, that is looked upon to judge the ‘righteousness’ of the path. It also brings to light the matter of who were the ‘foreigners’ and who were the ‘natives’ and, as can obviously be seen, these matters are highly sensitive and lead to extremely charged debates!

It is extremely difficult to discover the truth behind the Aryan debate, because, as Trautmann rightly says, “the truth of ancient history is indifferent to our wishes, our politics, our religion… the idea of truth in history involves the idea that exists independent of our will, and is therefore difficult to know, because our interpretations are will-bound and our facts are never independent of our theories”.

I shall now attempt to contextualise this debate, to put it into today’s perspective. The relevance of the Aryan debate can be seen from the influence of the colonial period on India’s present to our current political scenario and, right up to controversial comments of certain Right-wing politicians in the very recent past. The present volatile situation in India has made Western, and many Indian, scholars particularly concerned about the repercussions of communal interpretations of history.

The theory of the Aryan race is not limited to historical reconstruction and is an example of how historical perceptions of the past can be related to conflictual situations of the present. This debate is intensely relevant to the constructions of several very different sets of competing identities: associations of coloniser and colonised, neo-colonial and Hindu fundamentalist, indigenous and foreigner, Hindu communal and Marxist secularist etc.

The conquest of the ‘fair-skinned Aryans’ over the ‘dark-skinned aborigines’ became the mechanism by which caste came to be viewed as a form of racial segregation and was central to Indian social institutions.

The debate over how ‘Aryanism’ was to be interpreted provides us insight into the political agendas of the groups who used it. These groups were involved in seeking identities from the past and in countering each other’s claims to these identities as well as choosing a homeland and working out a national culture. The interpretation therefore hinged on specific ideological needs. The primary concern in establishing an Indian identity was the need to define the rightful inheritors of the land. Here the question of origins and affirmations of common descent was central to nation-building. It is thus important to consider modern ideological underpinnings of this debate in India as different forces compete over the construction of national identity.

The Aryan invasion theory also has a genesis in colonial attempts to ‘discover’ the Indian past, a discovery which was rooted in the colonial present.

During the earlier phase of the ‘homeland of the Aryans’ quest, when India was still a popular candidate, many scholars were uncomfortable about moving the Indo-Europeans too far from their biblical origins somewhere in the Near East. There were those among the British, in particular, whose colonial sensibilities made them reluctant to acknowledge any potential cultural indebtedness to the forefathers of the rickshaw pullers of Calcutta, and who preferred to hang on to the biblical Adam for longer than their European contemporaries. Even well after Adam was no longer in the picture, there was a very cool reception in some circles to the “late Prof. Max Muller who had blurted forth to a not over-grateful world the news that we and our revolted sepoys were of the same human family”.  Muller noted, “They would not have it, they would not believe that there could be any community of origin between the people of Athens and Rome, and the so-called Niggers of India…”

The Indomania of the early British Orientalists was replaced by an Indophobia initiated by Evangelicalism. Charles Grant epitomised this by stressing the absolute difference, in all respects, between the British and the despicable natives of the subcontinent. Grant was by no means the first or sole Christian leader to engage in extreme denunciations against Hinduism – these continued throughout the colonial period. Christian evangelists, in fact, found advantages in discourses of Aryan kinship. For instance, Samuel Laing held that the “two races so long separated meet once more… the younger brother has become the stronger, and takes his place as the head and protector of the family… we are here… on a sacred mission, to stretch out the right hand of aid to our weaker brother, who once far outstripped us, but has now fallen behind in the race”.

Devendraswarup, a historian of the colonial period, finds the scholarly work of missionary intellectuals to be readily presenting the Brahmins as foreigners who had imposed their Vedic language and texts onto the aboriginals of India. The idea in this case was to create a sense of alienation from Brahmanical religion among the lower castes, thereby preparing them for exposure and conversion to Christianity.

Clearly, the developing pressure to justify the colonial and missionary presence in India prompted the denigration of Indian civilisation, and the shunning of embarrassing cultural and linguistic ties. Trautmann suggests that such considerations also explain why the British, despite having primary access to Sanskrit source material, did not pursue the study of comparative philology. Racial theorists paved the way for the postulate that the Aryans were an autonomous white race who brought civilisation and the Sanskrit language to the different races of India– a development Trautmann holds as pivotal to the political construction of Aryan identity developing in Germany.

The colonial view would endorse the idea that the progress of India was dependent on the return of the Aryan in the guise of the British. The British presence in the subcontinent could now be cast as a rerun several millennia later of a similar script, but a script that hoped to have a different ending. The British could now present themselves as a second wave of Aryans, again bringing a superior language and civilisation to the racial descendants of the same natives their forefathers had attempted to elevate so many centuries earlier. Devendraswarup argues that after the British were shaken by the Great Revolt of 1857, certain individuals suddenly found reason to stress their common Aryan bond with the Brahmins where others had previously shunned it. The Aryan connection was thus simply manipulated at will.

This view was partially responsible for the extreme nationalist rejection of the theory that Aryans were anything other than indigenous. Rajaram stated that the Aryan invasion theory is “the fabrication of a version of ancient history and tradition that was highly advantageous to missionary and colonial interests”. This discourse is also attacked as some claim that it attempts to promote disunity between Dravidians and northerners. Shankaracharya believed that “the Indologists and Orientalists introduced the till then unheard of concept of Aryans and Dravidians, which created mutual hatred”. Supporters of the migration theory are now faced with several accusations. The major one is that the British Raj from the 19th century to the present day promoted the Aryan invasion hypothesis in support of Euro-centric notions of white supremacy. Assertions that the highly advanced proto-Hindu Vedic culture could not have had its roots in India are seen as attempts to bolster European ideas of dominance.

I have earlier discussed how the discourse of Aryanism affected religious and political identities in post-Enlightenment Europe. I shall now go on to examine how the same theme has been utilized to support a variety of agendas on the Indian subcontinent in the modern period. It should however be kept in mind that not all scholars who have written for or against the Aryan invasion theory are politically motivated.

In this context, there are essentially two opposing interpretations, the Dalit one pioneered by Jyotiba Phule, and the Hindutva one pioneered by Veer Savarkar.

Let us begin with Hindutva, since this is the element of most pressing concern. The Hindutva interpretation follows a strong imperative to stress the racial unity of the Indian people prior to the coming of Islam and the solidarity of the Brahmins and non-Brahmins within Hinduism as well as the differences of Hindus from Muslims and Christians. It tends to reject an Aryan homeland outside of India, and to identify Vedic civilisation with the Indus Civilisation.

Savarkar’s Hindutva, literally ‘Hinduness’, or the essential quality of being a Hindu, has been a very influential expression of Hindu self-identity. Savarkar’s book on Hindutva was eventually adopted by the Hindu Mahasabha, and is still a seminal text of Hindu nationalist groups such as the RSS (Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh). Savarkar’s writings clearly reveal the crux of Hindutva – to be considered a native of Hindustan, a person’s religious faith must have an indigenous origin. What, then, of other Indians – those whose religious beliefs blossomed in other lands – where do they fit into such a scheme of things? Savarkar writes on – “That is why in the case of some of our Mohammedan or Christian countrymen who had originally been forcibly converted to a non-Hindu religion and who consequently have inherited, along with the Hindus, a common fatherland and a greater part of the wealth of a common culture are not and cannot be recognised as Hindus. For though Hindusthan to them is Fatherland, as it is to any other Hindu, yet it is not to them a holy land too. Their holy land is far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and godmen, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. They must set their holy land above their Fatherland…” Savarkar believes that the Muslims and Christians can never participate in the benefits (whatever they might be) of Hindutva because their prophet was born on the wrong side of the Arabian Sea!

Returning to the Aryan theme, it should be evident how the basis of Savarkar’s Hindutva is undermined if the Vedic Aryans came from central Asia. If that were the case, then the followers of Vedic religion would have to be disqualified from being Hindus, since the original founders of their faith were not born and bred in Bharat. Acceptance of the Aryan invasion theory according to Savarkar’s logic would then imply that the forefathers of the Vedic Aryans are undoubtedly foreigners and their followers essentially no different from those revering other “foreigners” such as Muhammad or Christ. Also, if the Aryans came from somewhere near the Caspian Sea area, adjacent to Persia, they would actually share close blood links with the proto-Iranians, thereby making the Vedic Aryans much closer relatives in language, proto-religion and blood with the Muslims who came to India from these areas.

Therefore, the opposition of other RSS leaders, such as M.S. Golwalkar, to the Aryan invasion theory was extremely aggressive. He said, “It was the wily foreigner, the Britisher, who to achieve his ulterior motives, set afloat all such mischievous notions among our people so that the sense of patriotism and duty towards the integrated personality of our motherland was corroded. He carried on the insidious propaganda that we were never one nation, that we were never the children of the soil but mere upstarts having no better claims than the foreign hordes of Muslims or the British over this country”. This brand of Hindu nationalism, which seems determined to alienate the Muslim community on the grounds of its lack of religious pedigree, is obliged to refute the Aryan invasion theory or risk logical absurdity.

Where Savarkar specifies the importance of India as the geographic land of religious revelation in his criteria for Hindutva, Shrikant Talageri considers the psychological bond to be more significant. He argues that while Indian culture absorbs and assimilates newcomers, Islam and Christianity do not; the leaders, founders, saints, sacred languages, scripts, holy places, traditional attire etc all owe allegiance to cultures outside India. He essentially requires that the Muslims, if not convert completely, at least accept Hindu concepts and beliefs, even those that might completely jar with their own religious sensibilities. He categorically stated, “The non-Hindu people in Hindusthan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence the Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture… or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, not even citizen’s rights”.

There can be no doubt that Hindutva is easily pressed into service in alienating and targeting the Muslim minority in communally volatile, modern-day India. Irfan Habib said in a newspaper interview: “I would like to cite the example of the Nazis, of how a particular perception of history held by a respectable section of the German intelligentsia, which was not racist at least outwardly and certainly was not anti-Jewish, was so easily utilised by the Nazis… so, here you have an example of how a historical theory is created by someone who had no idea of what use it can be put to… before 1947 the idea that Aryans went out of India was hardly espoused by any serious historian… but now, while some people deny that they espouse the Nazi race theory, they have in fact espoused it”. Not surprisingly, the various Hindutva versions either deny the validity of the linguistic analyses or else ignore them. From this perspective, archaeology is now viewed as important to the identity of the Aryans, but not so linguistics.

The Dalit interpretation, on the other hand, maintained that the lower castes were the indigenous inhabitants who had been conquered and oppressed by Brahmins who represented the Aryan conquest. This view was expounded initially by Jyotiba Phule. Writing in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Phule argued that the original inhabitants of India were the Adivasis, among whom he included the Sudras, the ati-Sudras and the untouchables, who were descendants of the heroic peoples led by the Daitya king, Bali. The indigenous peoples under the leadership of Bali, fought the arrival of the Brahmins who for Phule represented the Aryan invasion, but the Adivasis were conquered and subordinated. Phule’s ‘golden age’ was the period prior to the Aryan invasion when Sudras were cultivators, landowners and warriors, and had their own culture. The Brahmins are said to have deliberately invented caste so that the Sudras would be kept permanently servile and divided among themselves. He argued that the rightful inheritors of the land were the lower castes, not the Brahmins.

Phule was not merely concerned with the indigenous origins of the lower castes but he was also a ‘social reformer’ working towards educating Sudras and women with the intention of providing them with a sense of relative independence. In the colonial-nationalist divide, his views were not entirely supportive of either.

The dichotomy between Brahmin and non-Brahmin was seen to provide a rational expression for the pattern of history and the suppression of the non-Brahmin by the Brahmin. Brahmins were seen as Sanskrit-educated Aryans and the other castes using Dravidian languages were the non-Aryans. The use of language for demarcation was perhaps one reason for the non-Brahmin movement being more influential in peninsular India (the heartland of Dravidian languages) than elsewhere.

There are others who support the Aryan invasion theory, but do not necessarily share Phule’s ideas, including Romila Thapar. She remarks: “The theory of the Aryans being a people has been seen as fundamental to the understanding of the identity of modern Indians and the question of identity is central to the change in Indian society from caste to class. The upholding of a false theory is dangerous. The next step can be to move from the indigenous origin of ‘the Aryans’ to propagating the notion of an ‘Aryan nation’”.

This ‘school’ of scholars is often branded ‘Left-liberal’ or ‘secular Marxist’ by opponents of the invasion theory, because its model of invasion and subordination corresponded to Marxist concepts of class struggle and ideology. Secular Marxists are accused of maintaining a defunct theory in order to insist that the arrival of the Aryans is analogous to the arrival of the Muslims, Christians, and other groups of newcomers to the subcontinent. In such an amalgamation of immigrants, no one has more claims to indigenous pedigree or cultural hegemony than anyone else.

Chakrabarti, an Indigenous Aryanist, has nothing but scorn for the Indian intellectual elite who “fail to see the need of going beyond the dimensions of colonial Indology, because these dimensions suit them fine and keep them in power”. The most maligned figureheads are precisely those who have most publicly opposed the Indigenous Aryan position, particularly R.S. Sharma and Romila Thapar. She, in turn, holds that “indigenism is intellectually and historiographically barren with no nuances or subtleties of thought and interpretation”. In India, some Indigenous Aryanists, being branded communal, then label their detractors either “colonial stooges” or “secular Marxists” who are motivated by their own political agendas.

The question of Aryanism and the beginnings of Indian history remains a complex problem because it still carries, at the popular level, the baggage of nineteenth century European preconceptions, even if in the European context it has now been rejected as a nineteenth century myth. It has overwhelmed Indian history, but is now less important to a nationalist reconstruction of the past, although the Hindutva version claims to derive from a nationalist cause and accuses those who disagree of being anti-national. Its real function in their hands is political, in that it is used to separate the supposedly indigenous Hindu Aryan from the alien, the Muslim and the Christian; or, in the case of the Dalit interpretation, the indigenous lower castes from the alien upper castes.

The crux of the debate is the crisis of identity and status in the claims to political and social power and a contestation over what is viewed as alternative forms of national culture and ethnic homogeneity. Though the debate itself may never truly be resolved for a lack of concrete evidence it continues to be relevant today not only in its controversial content but also because it shows us how misguided perceptions, narrow-mindedness and political agendas can be detrimental to the development of a nation and its international relations, the peaceful co-existence of its people as well as the analysis of its history.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect InPEC’s editorial position.

The Strange Politics of Anna Hazare

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By Siddharth Singh, 12 Oct, 2011

Anna Hazare’s recent threat to campaign against the Congress party in case they don’t help pass his version of the Jan Lokpal Bill in the Uttar Pradesh (UP) elections is an artful move. Much as the Congress would like to dismiss this threat citing the non-existent political roots of Anna, it needs to tread with caution given it draws substantial support from the Middle-class in UP.  The Congress has pinned its re-election prospects, as well as the political prospects of Rahul Gandhi, to its performance in UP.  By threatening to strike the Congress where it would hurt the most, Anna has been very strategic.

However, while this move by him may see an initial success in Hisar’s by-polls (which is a constituency that wasn’t leaning towards the Congress in the first place),  it risks becoming a cause for the downfall of this movement. Political fault-lines in Uttar Pradesh lie – unfortunately – on issues of caste and religion, and to an extent – fortunately – on  the governance (or mis-governance) records of the respective parties. While the general call of ending corruption may resonate with the society, the electorate may not swing their votes in favour of parties that promise to implement certain legislation over others in the future. Especially not if the record of such parties on corruption and graft is equally if not more suspect than that of the Congress. In case they choose to do so, it may still not work towards meeting Anna’s goals.

Anna’s call may be further diluted in case the Congress manages to pass some version of the  Lokpal Bill before the UP elections. The Congress’ announcement that the Lokpal Bill envisages the body to be a Constitutional authority may work to dilute Team Anna’s position.

Realistically, two results can be expected from such an anti-Congress ploy in UP:  either Anna turns out to be successful in wooing the people away from the Congress, or he doesn’t. In the case of the first eventuality, if the result is the election of individuals and parties with a record of graft and corruption, then the purpose of the agitation would be lost. If the idea was to kick out the corrupt, then it makes no sense to work towards replacing one set of corrupt with another. This may lead to substantial disillusionment with the public. More so because a fractured mandate which includes the corrupt would diminish the chances of the passage of the Jan Lokpal Bill.

In the case of the second eventuality, the Congress  would claim popular victory and support for its policy on corruption and the popular rejection of Team Anna.  Either way, this movement would only lose out on the popular support it has garnered.

Annaji, as he is known by the public, may well be advised to not go ahead with such a simplistic call which may well prove to be counterproductive. If he wishes to hold on to the legitimacy he has earned in the past few months, he ought not to alienate his core constituency by aiding – indirectly – the victory of parties that are no less, if not worse, than the Indian National Congress when it comes to the issue of graft.

Occupy America – As Occupy Wall Street Spreads We Ask: Who Are the 99%?

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Occupy DC

By Jack Hamilton, 12 Oct, 2011

What is the ‘Occupy’ Movement?

The ‘Occupy’ movement started four weeks ago on Wall Street and more than 100 solidarity movements have since sprung up across the country as activists have taken to the streets to oppose what they perceive to be the injustices of the corporate and financial sectors.

Contrary to some media attention the protests are not solely comprised of ‘hippies in hoodies’ and ‘tattooed vandals sporting Guy Fawkes masks’. I met with nurses and military veterans, fire-fighters and lecturers, librarians and libertarians. It is not an explosion of violence as a result of disenfranchisement or a day in the park but an ongoing event which seeks to focus attention on the issues of jobs and financial reform. There are also some crazy people there who I will come back to. For now it is important to focus on the goals of the ‘Occupy’ movement and the tactics through which they seek to achieve them.

Funny Signs Can Stop Bailouts

What Are Their Goals?

1. Urgency

Nouriel Roubini, better known as Dr. Doom for predicting the financial crash of 2007-2008 has rightly asserted “There’s a huge amount of anger”. The protestors remain steadfast in their belief that the current financial system is heading for another meltdown if no reforms are made and the current system continues unabated. Dr. Doom agrees. In an interview with Foreign Policy Roubini described the protests as “a symptom of economic malaise” that is being felt not only in the United States across the world. The first facet of the ‘Occupy’ movement is a rapid response to this impending disaster.

2. Agency

One of the most prominent signs at McPherson Square, DC read in bold letters ‘We need to Unfuck Ourselves’. This message clearly outlines the trope that the Occupiers perceive themselves to be the victims of the system and have taken it upon themselves to become active political agents and drive policy reform. The catchy image of the 99% rallying against the 1% has spread from the initial Wall Street protest across the various national spokes and it resonates strongly.

3. ?

Urgency and agency can best be described as two themes of the protests but when it comes to clear and defined policy goals the unity lapses dramatically. For some Obama is simply Hitler, a narcissist and a puppet of corporatism who must be sacrificed for the more malleable alternative in Joe Biden. For others it is the ongoing imperialism of the British Empire which is subjugating the world economy to the demands of the monarchy (I am not making this up) and they do so under the guise of soft power organisations. One of the bastions of this soft power network is the Wildlife and Wetland Fund (still not making this up) which uses the guise of environmental aid to dictate policy across the world. It is worth saying at this stage that I am not impartial on the subject as my Mother is a member of the WWF and counts birds in Northern Ireland on occasion. I will be sure to ask her if she has been intrinsic to any global domination plots, ornithological or economic, when I speak to her tomorrow.

No Unity

The movement has been compared to the emergence of the Tea Party in 2009, breathing life into the conservative Republicans and influencing the 2010 elections which put in place a House of Representatives intent on blocking the Obama administration at every opportunity. By comparison the ‘Occupy’ protestors have no set of unified policy goals. The Tea Party opposed tax increases, demanded a cut in government spending and most of all rallied in opposition to something tangible: the sitting administration. The ‘Occupy’ protestors are apathetic towards Obama, who many of them voted for, but are also strongly opposed to all other parties. The narrative is clear: corporations have too much power. The policy alternatives and tactics are less so. Without tangible goals it is difficult to see tangible change occurring.

Chances of Success?

Is there any real pressure for the 1% to change their trajectory? The antipathy directed at the financial sector across large swathes of the globe has led to limited reforms and curtailed few bailouts. Protests in London and New York may lack a coherent agenda and action but there is no doubting that they have staying power and the longer they remain the more focus will be placed upon their agendas.

The Future

There are many questions that remain. The first issue is the nature of Roubini’s pending recession. Will it be another collapse along the lines of 2007-08 or will it be something more manageable. This may come down to the fate of the Euro-zone fringes. With Greece teetering on the brink of a disastrous default and Spain and Italy suffering the indignity of having their economies downgraded within the last week the crisis is showing little signs of abating. An article in The Economist posited that the continued uncertainty may actually play into the hands of Germany as it may be able to force the reform of the banking havens such as Ireland and Cyprus despite US objections. Merkel has a point. As soon as the European Central Bank intervened to stabilise Italy’s bond markets over the Summer, Berlusconi retreated from his austerity programme citing pressure from within his coalition. Financial panic is a self-fulfilling prophesy, a prophesy which the protestors should take heed of.

After the catastrophe in Japan earlier this year Germany took the lead in announcing that it would phase out nuclear power, whatever the cost, and turned to the nuclear power stations in France and Switzerland to plug the capacity gaps. When it comes to the sovereign debt crisis the most powerful country in Europe seems far more accepting of the risks of meltdown.

This does not mean that Europe is in a perpetual state of gridlock. Much has been made of the incapacities of European states to interact with each other the subsequent economic consequences. The strong European economies certainly resent having to bail out those who are perceived to have mismanaged their finances but that does not mean that they will cease to do so. One only needs to look at the passing of the Lisbon Treaty to see that the individual wills of European states can be subsumed in the European ideal and that the European institutions are much stronger than the Euro-sceptics are willing to accept. While the Mandelbaums and Thomas Friedmans of the world wax lyrical about the opportunities of a new Marshall Plan it must be remembered that this is not a post-war Europe and would not take kindly to being treated as such.

We the People

It is highly limiting to view 1% of society as being responsible for every problem of the 99%. Where does this leave the highly divisive issue of Medicare or the broader issues of over-consumption and overspending? While these issues are more acute in the ‘1%’ they are certainly wider than the ‘Occupy’ protests imply. If all of the problems descend from a simple high peak of American society then surely the solutions must simply focus on scaling that one summit? The reality is that those advocating financial reform need to look beyond their own mountain and see the full range. If the movement is to achieve its goals it requires a behaviour modification of much more than the top 1%.

The Democratic Peace Thesis: Not a Force for Peace After All

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By Aryaman Bhatnagar, 10 Oct, 2011

The attempts to establish a strong symbiotic relationship between Liberalism and peace can be traced back to the times of writers like Kant, Montesquieu and Rousseau. They proposed that liberal domestic constitutional and institutional mechanisms would make liberal states inherently more peaceful (Macmillan, 1978, p.278). It is the legacy of such works that has continued down till this day to influence a number of theorists, many of whom perceive liberalism to be a force for absolute pacifism. It has, in fact, provided the basis for the “Democratic Peace Thesis”, which argues that liberal democratic states never wage war against each other.

This pacification of foreign relations among liberal states is said to be a direct product of their shared legitimate political orders based on democratic principles and institutions. The reciprocal recognition of these common principles leads liberal democracies to share a feeling of mutual trust and respect towards each other reducing the possibility of war. Moreover, democratic institutions such as public opinion, legislatures and the electoral process make leaders more accountable making the possibility of large-scale war nearly impossible. Finally, the commercial ties between the liberal states also foster a spirit of interdependence and cooperation, further, reinforcing the ‘zone of peace’ between them. It is these transnational ties, liberal institutions and ideas, which together can account for sustained peace among the liberal states. It is also argued that liberal states are as war-prone or as aggressive in their approach to non-liberal states like other states and that they wage wars only for liberal or humanitarian purposes (Doyle, 2005).

The Democratic Peace thesis has found considerable support among a number of theorists. Jack S. Levy stated “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations (Levy, cited in Chan, 1997, p.60).” However, it has been heavily criticised on the grounds that it oversimplifies the explanation of the existence of peace. Moreover, they believe that this thesis itself may be used by some nations as intellectual justification for the belief that spreading democracy abroad will perform the dual task of enhancing their national security and promoting world peace (Rosato, 2003, p.585).

This essay will attempt to evaluate liberalism as a force for peace in light of criticism against the Democratic Peace Thesis. My main argument is that liberalism by itself is not enough to create, preserve or explain the existence of peace between nations. While liberal states themselves do not always stay away from conflict, there are also other factors that play an important role in creating peace. Moreover, I will also show how the belief of liberalism as a force of peace can create war.

Democracies and the Use of Force

Do democratic states stay at peace with each other when their interests clash? If one looks at empirical examples then it can be said that democracies are still willing to use force in order to achieve their ends even against democracies (Macmillan, 1996, p.281). When interests clash even liberal states tend to behave like any other states, bargaining hard, issuing threats and, at times, using military force. In such situations, the nature of the adversary regime is of very little value as vested interests tend to outweigh the liberal principles. The US intervention in the developing world during the Cold War period testifies this fact as the containment of Communism took precedence over respect for fellow democracies. The CIA helped in overthrowing democratic governments in Chile, Iran, Guatemala and Nicaragua replacing them with more authoritarian regimes (Rosato, 2003, p.590).

Wars between democracies have also taken place due to the fixity in the definition of democracy. As a result, a “hegemonic liberalism” defines out other historically valid democratic claims and may license violence against them (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, p.409). This is how the invasions of a number of democracies, as stated above, during the Cold War were justified by the US. Moreover, the mutual respect and trust between democracies can be maintained only if they consider each other to be liberal. But in the absence of any coherent mechanism to categorise democracies, the perceptions of states regarding the regime type of another state comes into picture. They often get another state’s regime type wrong, thereby, lessening our confidence in the fact that objectively democratic states will not fight one another (Rosato, 2003, p.592).

It should also be noted that democratic norms and institutions do not cause democracies to behave differently from non-democracies in systematic ways (Rosato, 2005, p.467). The public constrain, for instance, acts as a very small deterrent on the state’s decision to go to war. If it was a major constraint then it would be able to prevent them from going to war even against the non-democracies (Rosato, 2003, p.594) as the public should feel sensitive about the human and material cost of war with any state. At times, the public may actually welcome war as was seen during WW1, which was welcomed by the public in all participating countries of Europe, even though, some of them were fighting other liberal states.

Moreover, these democratic structures are as likely to drive states to war as to restrain them from it. Cabinets, legislatures and public were often more belligerent than the government heads they were supposed to constrain (Owen, 1994, p.91). These can be belligerent towards democracies as well. This was evident during the build up to WW1.

Apart from looking at such constraints that could prevent war between democracies, it is also important to investigate the deepening of a democratic ethos within specific countries (Chan, 1997, p.66). While stable, well established democracies may not fight one another, a nascent democracy or rocky transition towards a fragile democracy may not necessarily imply that countries become immediately more peaceful. The transition phase of democracies is supposed to be quite dangerous and the nascent democracies are more likely to be caught up in wars (Ward and Gleditsch, 1998, p.53). The transition in Eastern Europe, for instance, had left the population “free to hate” (Ward and Gleditsch, 1998, p.54) resulting in large-scale ethnic cleansing of minority groups.

The instability in such new regimes can hardly create a spirit of mutual trust and respect that may prevent war between nations. In fact, at times, stable autocratic regimes are less prone to conflict and escalation to war. This can be seen with a number of non-liberal states like Cuba, Belarus and more recently, China that is emerging as a potential superpower through the use of its “soft power”.

Along with chaos in new democracies, the existence of civil wars and insurgencies in liberal states create obstacles in viewing them as symbols of pacifism. If democratic norms and culture fail to prevent the outbreak of civil war or insurgency within democracies, what reason is there to believe that they will prevent the out-break of interstate wars between democracies (Layne, 1994, p.41). Moreover, the states may use coercive and violent means to put an end to these movements and if they can resort to such methods against their own people then there is no guarantee that they would be not resort to such methods in the context of international relations. The independent history of some democratic nations like Sri Lanka, Algeria, Nepal, Lebanon among others have been seriously affected by such violent movements, which tend to seriously undermine the claim that democratic nations are inherently more peaceful.

The failure to recognise the changing nature of ‘war’ and the various implications of the word ‘peace’ have also strengthened this belief of peace among nations. The perception of war being a sustained violent conflict fought by organised armed forces, which are directed by a governmental authority (Starr, 1997, p.154) cannot hold in light of the changing nature of warfare. The liberal states may not confront each other through conventional warfare but through proxies or the armed units of the indigenous nations, who were armed by the superpowers themselves. Thus, while, the occurrence of overt conflict maybe extremely rare, states- even the liberal ones- have started to confront each other through covert means (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, p.412).  In recent times, India and Pakistan are said to confront each other through such means. It is alleged that they try to destabilise each other by arming insurgent or militant groups in each other’s territories rather than confront each other through conventional means.

It is for this reason that the absence of war should not be equated with peace as the two phenomena are conceptually different (Chan, 1997, p.66). The absence of violence may be replaced by hostile diplomatic relations and constant threats of war. The Indo-Pak relations have followed such a pattern for the last sixty years, wherein, the threat of war or use of force has generally overshadowed all other forms of conflict resolution. This situation of ‘negative peace’ that creates a war like atmosphere can hardly be conducive to a more literal form of peace and harmony.

Why are Democracies Peaceful Towards Each Other?

If we were to accept the hypothesis that liberal states may actually be more peaceful towards each other than with a non-liberal state, it is unlikely that this can be explained by their liberal democratic norms or political institutions alone. Liberal states employ factors other than liberalism in deciding questions of peace and war (Macmillan, 1996, p.280).

These factors could be borne out of a common culture that tends to bind states together irrespective of the nature of their regime. The states are often caught up in geo-strategic and socio-economic relations because of which they tend to maintain the equilibrium through peaceful non-violent means (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, p.421). This is highly evident in case of International bodies like the European Union, NATO, SAARC and ASEAN. It is the shared interests of the member nations of these bodies that prevent them from going to war against each other as the maintenance of peace is imperative for the cultural and economic development in this region. Moreover, in case of ASEAN, the member states are not always democratic in nature, yet, wars are avoided between the member nations clearly showing that states are motivated by factors other than liberal norms.

The existence of the democratic zone of peace can also be achieved by the presence of a local hegemon, which imposes a peaceful order in the concerned region and satisfaction of the states with territorial status quo. The existence of the ‘zone of peace’ in North America can be explained through this idea. The countries of this region are satisfied with the existing balance of power in which the US is the leading nation and have no territorial ambitions of their own. This has helped in maintaining peace between the concerned nations (Kaeowicz, 1995).

One also needs to realise that wars are so rare that random chance could account for the democratic peace (Owen, 1994, p.88). A dyad of nations becomes significant only if there is a real possibility of two states going to war (Layne, 1994, p.39). If motives, means and opportunities are absent then it is only natural that there would be no war between those nations. For instance, Senegal and Costa Rica both are liberal nations but the lack of warfare between them should be understood more in terms of the lack of any significant external relations between them (Macmillan, 1996,p.281).

Liberalism: A Barrier for Peace   

We can, finally, turn our attention to some of the practical implications of this thesis, which act as serious obstacles in the attainment of world peace. The belief that democratic nations do not go to war against one another has become an important aspect of the western policy. The logic of this discourse is that if democratic nations alone do not go to war against each other then it is important to create more of them, thereby, creating a more peaceful world (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, p.423). This can fuel a spirit of democratic crusade and be used to justify covert or overt interventions against others (Chan, 1997, p.59).

According to many observers, the spread of democracy to different parts of the world has become the central focus of the American foreign policy post the Cold War and especially post-9/11. The US has taken up the moral responsibility of ensuring that a global liberal order is created, which is crucially linked not only to its own security but also to that of its allies. For this they will not hesitate to use their military power in a more aggressive and pre-emptive manner (Rhodes, 2003, p.134). The war against Iraq was also justified on these grounds.

This liberal interventionist role can have serious repercussions for world peace. It can be viewed as efforts to create an empire that would naturally offset a reaction against it. In the mid-90s, the attempts to create liberal states in Central and Eastern Europe to facilitate the expansion of NATO had seriously strained the US-Russian relations (Layne, 1994, p.47). Such extension into “Russia’s backyard” can also lay the foundation for future conflicts.  The deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia, which ultimately resulted in the outbreak of war between the two in 2008 can be said to be rooted in the US efforts to include Georgia in NATO.  Similarly, the US image has taken a severe beating among the Arab states following its invasion of Iraq. The efforts to set up liberal institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan have acted as a catalyst for a number of non-state entities to carry out acts of terror in the region against the American presence and her backed regime.

Conclusion

The Democratic Peace Thesis seems to be based on hope and on the image of an idealised notion of what the world ought to be like. In reality, nations tend to maintain peace with other nations- irrespective of the regime type- as long as their own vested interests are not being compromised. The normative and institutional mechanisms that are meant to constraint the liberal nations from waging war can hardly override the pursuit of national interests. Even when peace is maintained it is probably explained more by these vested interests than commonality of a political culture.
Finally, it is important to note that peace is not the sole prerogative of democracies alone. Peaceful relations have also characterised many non-democratic polities throughout history and authoritarian regimes, at times, are more likely to maintain peace as compared to nascent democracies.

The essay hence establishes that the link between peace and liberalism has been over glorified by the Democratic Peace thesis. Peace is a complex issue that only a complex web of factors can explain and Liberalism maybe just one aspect of it.

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Bibliography

  • Barkawi, T and M. Laffey, 1999.The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization. European Journal of International Relations, 5(4), pp.403-34
  • Chan, S., 1997. In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise. Mershon International Studies Review, 41(1), pp.59-91
  • Doyle, M.D., 2005. Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace. The American Political Science Review, 99 (3), pp.463-66
  • Kaeowicz, A.M., 1995. Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?. Journal of Peace Research, 32 (3), pp. 265-76
  • Layne, C., 1994. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. International Security, 19 (2), pp.5-49
  • Macmillan, J., 1996. Democracies Don’t Fight: A Case of the Wrong Research Agenda?. Review of International Studies, 22(3), pp. 275-99
  • Owen, J.M., 1994. How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security, 19(2), pp. 87-125
  • Rhodes, E., 2003. The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda. Survival, 45 (1), pp.131-52
  • Rosato, S., 2003. The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory. The American Political Science Review, 97 (4), pp.585-602
  • Rosato, S.,2005. Explaining the Democratic Peace. The American Political Science Review, 99 (3), pp. 467-72
  • Starr, H., 1997. Democracy and Integration: Why Democracies Don’t Fight Each Other. Journal of Peace Research, 34 (2), pp.153-62
  • Ward, M. D. and K.S. Gleditsch, 1998. “Democratizing for Peace”. The American Political Science Review, 92 (1),pp.51-61

The Lighthouse in the Desert

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By Jack Hamilton, 9 Oct, 2011

Folklore spills across time creating and undoing history as it ebbs. Whole identities can be constructed and deconstructed in these stories but it is rare in these ages that entire maps can be reimagined due to a single small tree. The old addage “so geographers in Afric maps, with savage pictures fill their gaps” has long since faded but this is a story about one such ‘gap’, the one piece of life within it and the price of life that goes with it.

The Sahara Desert is awash with a sandstorm of whispers and this particular spec is the lonely Tree of Ténéré. It is a story which entails trust amidst gossip as well as the dangers of blind trust in a terrain in which one can see for miles. Upon first hearing the story I didn’t believe that such a tree could ever have existed. In recent weeks a terrorist cell linked to al-Qaeda was undone by their belief that the tree still existed. However, I must start by describing the story of the tree.

There was once a solitary tree standing in the centre of the Sahara Desert. Between the Baobabs of Senegal and the Olive Trees of Tunisia remained one sole survivor of a bygone era. Millenia ago the tree had been part of a great forest which had gradually died off as the Sahara became the inhospitable mother she is today. One tree remained to guide all those who dared to traverse the barren lands. It was a beacon: the lighthouse in the desert.

The nomads of the desert alone knew of this tree and used it as a tracking mechanism when traversing the most desolate depths of enduring beige. When these Tuareg would encounter the Fulani in north east Mali they would recount their tracks in order to let the Fulani know of their passage, including the waypoint of the tree in the middle of the desert. Having listened politely to the detailed directions the Fulani would thank the Tuareg and see them on their way providing that no disagreements had been reached.

At this stage the Fulani would all agree never to follow the route of the Tuareg. These men had seemingly been driven dangerously insane by the desert. Of course, there is no chance for a tree to exist in such a place. There are no trees for hundreds of miles in the Sahel (the shoreline of the desert), let alone the Sahara. If this route had a proclivity for perverting the minds of the fearsome Tuareg, it was no place for men.

This story circulated until the times when modern technology made it possible for mere mortals to take the route. Safe inside the machinery that would be used to fight the Second World War, Europeans were able to cross the desert here in hopes of cutting off a rival. It was at this time that they too believed themselves to have gone insane too as in the horizon the withered spectre of an acacia tree loomed. They had not been in the desert long enough to have reached the Libyan coast and had not crossed the Italian lines that would have inevitably preceded the water. It could not be Algeria as there had been no sign of the southern Air mountains. The story was true. They had discovered the Tree of Ténéré. The most isolated life on Earth.

It is here that a part of the mystery ends. Confused and in search of the truth the Europeans (a French division) decided to dig underneath the tree and discovered a well 35 metres down. While the fairytale of the tree was slightly depleted the beacon took on a new significance as not only being the only life but suddenly becoming a redeemer of life in the harsh conditions of the Sahara. The tree was not a mirage but the literal symbol of water in the desert.

However, as with all of these stories of the desert, it ends in tragedy. In the 1970s a Libyan truck driver somehow careered into the tree, allegedly drunk. Upon hearing this part of the story I was always interested to hear how the driver could explain this to his boss. He had somehow managed to hit the only tree in a 400km radius.

The reason I was reminded of this story was due to reading intelligence reports from the security forces tracking al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (the Saharan branch of the terrorist organisation). One of the Algerian trackers claimed that they had an intimate knowledge of the desert and in the pursuit they had passed the Tree of Ténéré. Today in the place of the tree stands a simple metal sculpture representing the optimism of the tree. Unfortunately the tracker described in great detail the tree as it looked before the 1970s, exactly the description that was recounted to me. It was clear that the ‘trackers’ did not know the desert and had possibly never crossed into Niger where the tree used to stand. They were found out immediately.

The idea of the Tree of Ténéré had always seemed to me like one of the lies which whispers around the desert. It brought a smile to my face that the myth was actually the truth and it was this fact that unveiled the fiction.

Jack Hamilton can be followed on Twitter @jmhamilton

Responsibility to Protect: A rebranding of Imperial Intervention

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By Aditya Sakorkar, 8 Oct, 2011

Introduction

Humanitarianism or Humanitarian intervention has attracted immense controversy and popularity since the end of the Cold War. Humanitarian intervention is usually employed to deliver a country and its people from war crimes, genocide and so forth. As Kuperman opines, humanitarian intervention is based in the altruistic desire to protect others (Kuperman, 2008, p.49). This essay examines the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, one of the most controversial ideas in modern times, from the perspective of John Stuart Mill’s ideas on intervention and non-intervention. The primary objective of this comparison is to identify if the R2P doctrine amount to a rebranding of imperial intervention. The essay begins with a brief discussion on Mill’s notions of intervention and non intervention; followed by an examination of the R2P doctrine and a conclusion that sums up the findings.

Mill’s Notion of Intervention/Non-intervention

John Stuart Mill, a philosopher and politician from Great Britain spoke on the notion of intervention/non-intervention, in his essay titled ‘A few words on Non-intervention.’ Mill, of course, wrote this essay in the context of the Suez Canal crisis and the Crimean War. However, the ideas he has proposed transcend these two scenarios and can easily be applied to other similar contexts. This section discusses Mill’s ideas on intervention and non-intervention in detail.

Mill wrote this text at a time when imperial rivalries were really getting more and more aggressive. He starts the article by describing Great Britain’s place in the world. In many ways, most people would agree, the opening section looks like a eulogy for Great Britain. It must be noted that he is candid about his views on this subject and intervention/non-intervention.

Mill puts forward the distinction between civilised and barbaric lands through three very clear points. In fact, he’s so specific about these distinctions that, together, they could easily pass as a model of some kind and could be used to justify interventions in the so called barbaric lands. It’s really not possible to incorporate the whole section of the text that distinguishes between barbaric and civilised lands. However, I will provide a short summary of the same.

Firstly, Mill speaks about the level of civilisation in a country. According to him, there is a big difference between 2 countries on par with each other in terms of their civilisation and one country which is highly civilised and the other one is low (Mill, 1859). Mill’s idea, however, of civilised nation is largely vague. That said, in one of the paragraphs he refers ‘Christian Europe as an equal community of nations.’ Christianity is what Mill had in mind when he was assessing the level of civilisation in a country, most likely. However, I would think that Christianity was only one of the parameters to assess the level of civilisation in a country.

Depending on how civilised a nation was, Mill assessed if the rules of international morality could be applied to it. If the nation is civilised, any rules that constitute international morality would be applicable. If the nation is not civilised or barbaric, these rules cannot be applied (Mill, 1859). Once again, what constitutes the rules of international morality is mostly not clear. However, sections of the opening paragraph could be used to formulate rules of international morality#.

Finally, Mill argues, if the rules of international morality are to be applied, the capacity of a country to reciprocate accordingly is essential. Civilised nations have the ability to reciprocate so they can be subjected to such rules. However, barbarians are in no position to reciprocate and consequently can’t be depended on to observe such rules. According to Mill, the barbarians’ minds are just not fit to perform a task of this kind (Mill, 1859). This argument or distinction is clearly stated by Mill as compared to the previous ones. However, this distinction in some ways reflects the prejudice that many Europeans had in this period that it was down to them to civilise the world.

Based on these distinctions, Mill creates three scenarios where intervention would be justified. Firstly, according to Mill, intervention is justified if the concerned nation is still barbarous. This is because invasion and subjugation by foreigners will only benefit such a nation. Also, Mill says that barbarians have no rights as nations except a right to be made fit to become a nation (Mill, 1859). This idea has a very strong racial basis to it. In fact, this justification, in many ways, echoes Hobson’s justification of imperialism: It is desirable that the earth should be peopled, governed, and developed, as far as possible, by the races which can do this work best, i.e. by the races of highest social efficiency (Hobson, 1902, p.154).

Secondly, Mill says that intervention by a civilised nation in a barbaric nation is justified if they share boundaries. Mill argues that the civilised nation cannot continue to have a defensive stance against a barbaric nation for too long. Eventually, the former will have to act so that the latter gets completely conquered or is so subdued that it becomes dependent on the civilised nation (Mill, 1859). This argument is applicable in other places as well. Meaning, a civilised state could intervene in a barbaric land anywhere in the world.

Thirdly, Mill argues that intervention is justified, if one nation calls another nation to assist in the suppression of its own population (Mill, 1859). It could be argued that this justification for intervention has, in some ways, a resonance of humanitarian intervention. An appropriate example of this scenario would be how General Franco came to power in Spain with Hitler’s and Mussolini’s assistance. On the basis of what Mill says, it would not have been a violation of the rules of international morality if the other European powers had intervened to prevent these developments. In fact, as Walzer argues, some military response is probably required at such moments if the values of independence and community are to be sustained (Walzer, 1977, 97).

For Mill, intervention is also justified in a country which subjugates its own people with the help of foreign arms and especially if they have what it takes to use and free institutions effectively (Mill, 1859). Like the previous condition, this also has a strong resonance of humanitarian intervention. A good example of this would be the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in the early 1970s.

Non-intervention

Mill also spoke about non-intervention just as candidly as he did on intervention. Like most liberals, Mill was very much for self-determination and self-help. In fact, he clearly says that in case a civil war is happening within a state, it should be left alone. For Mill, intervening in such situations, even to assist the citizens, would be violation of their right of self-determination. Mill also says that any group of people wanting use popular institutions need to brave the labours and peril of a revolution to become free. In essence, passing such a test would make them worthy of any popular institutions (Mill, 1859).

It could be argued that self-determination is something very close to Mill’s heart. Though he doesn’t mention it clearly, Mill may have been talking of democratic form of government and everything that is associated with it when he refers to popular institution. Also, he’s willing to let people take their own chances to reach such a stage, irrespective of the possible failure that they might encounter while they are at it. As Walzer argues, there is no right to be protected against the consequences failure, even if it means repression (Walzer, 1977, p.88).

One example of such a scenario would be the protests and the Tiananmen Square massacre in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1989. The people who participated in the protest endured the perils and labours of revolution for the sake of liberty. However, their success never materialised because of massive repression by the government. Most importantly, as negative it might seem, there was no intervention by any other country. This however, was also because of the fact that the PRC is a force to reckon with militarily and no country would want to antagonise it by initiating intervention.

Also, at first sight, this idea looks highly idealistic and, for Mill, this is the only foolproof way to do it (Mill, 1859). However, not everyone would share this view. According to Walzer, there is no shortage of revolutionaries who have demanded external help for their causes (Walzer, 1977, p.88).

Mill says that countries should have the love of liberty to maintain their freedom. However, such feelings may not arise if the country is ruled in ways that does not permit it. Such a government may be tyrannical or may have some other way of keeping its population from getting such thoughts; Mill does not clarify this. However, he says to develop such sentiments, the country needs to undertake an arduous struggle to gain freedom (Mill, 1859).

Mill’s argument about non-intervention in states having revolutions is a little problematic. What happens if the concerned state is, as Mill classifies it, barbaric? In that case, he would probably support and even highlight how important it is to intervene and subjugate the populace in order to make them fit to have popular institutions or democracy.

The Responsibility to Protect

The debate on humanitarian interventions came to the fore in the post Cold War period. The 1990s saw a range of conflicts within states which involved large scale genocide and ethnic cleansing and similar crimes. In some cases, these acts went to such an extent that the international community had to step in to put a stop to them. Certain cases such as Bosnia (1991-92) required full scale military action to stop the conflict. Ironically though, the international community did not intervene in Rwanda, where a large genocide began a little later than the Bosnian crisis. These problems fuelled the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention which paved way for the doctrine of R2P. This section takes a close look at the doctrine of (R2P) to assess if it is different from Mill’s notion of intervention. Also, this section explains concepts like failed states, rogue states and states that violate human rights because these almost form the core of the R2P discourse.

The idea of having a broad consensus on humanitarian interventions came to the fore in 1999 and 2000 in the UN General Assembly. It was the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan who posed a question to the international community (ICISS, 2001, p.VII):

…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?

This resulted in the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) under the auspices of the Canadian government and a group of major foundations. The sole objective of the commission was to prepare a report that addressed the moral, legal, operational and political questions associated with humanitarian interventions (ICISS, 2001, p.VII).

The report presented by the ICISS was titled “The Responsibility to Protect.” It recognises and reiterates the fact that a state has a legal identity in international law and that all states are equal irrespective of their size or capabilities. Each of these states has the right to make decisions within their territories regarding people and resources, as enshrined in the UN charter (ICISS, 2001, p.12). However, this right also brings certain responsibilities. Firstly, states have to protect their citizens and strive for their welfare. Secondly, states are responsible to their citizens and the international community through the UN. Thirdly, states or their agents are accountable for their actions (ICISS, 2001, p.13).

Under R2P, the state has three more responsibilities. The first one, the responsibility to prevent, expects states to address the direct and root causes of a conflict which may occur within its boundaries. The second one is the responsibility to react under which the states need to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures (including military action). The third one is the responsibility to rebuild which asks states to provide the necessary assistance for recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation; especially after a military intervention (ICISS, 2001, p.XI).

Besides, in case of interventions, issues need to be assessed from the perspective of the ones seeking support or help and not the interveners. The primary responsibility to protect lies with the concerned state. However, if the state can’t fulfil this responsibility for whatever reasons or is the perpetrator, the international community can step in. There are three responsibilities that need to be embraced by states under R2P doctrine (ICISS, 2001, p.17).

Similarly, the report of the UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, of January 2009, reiterated 2005 World Summit Outcome: Operationalisation of the R2P. The participating Heads of State mandated a three pillar strategy. Pillar one outlined the protection responsibilities of the states to protect its citizens from genocides, ethnic cleansing, war crimes etc. Pillar two called for international assistance and capacity building so that states can carry out their responsibilities. Pillar three calls for timely and decisive response to crisis scenarios if the state has failed to provide the necessary protection (Ban Ki-moon, 2009, p.8 & 9).

So, where is the R2P doctrine applicable? To put it simply, the R2P doctrine is most applicable in failed states, rogue states and in states where there is gross violation of human rights. Let’s take a look at these categories more closely.

Failed States

The Failed States Index explains that a state has failed when its government has lost control of its territory or its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Foreign Policy, 2005, p.57). However, this may not be the only cause why a state comes to be known as failed state. According to Rotberg, state failure can also be caused by a nation’s geographical, physical, historical and political circumstances, which include colonial errors and Cold War policy mistakes (Rotberg, 2002, p.127). There is also the human element that may result in state failure. As Rotberg argues, destructive decisions by leaders may also pave way for state failure (Rotberg, 2002, p.128).

Rogue States

Rogue States has become quite a common term in international politics. The most regular user of this term is the US. In fact, the term Rogue States, as Litwak argues, is efficient political shorthand that leaves no doubt any country’s place in the world of nations (Litwak, 2000). In essence, a rogue state is one, according to Litwak, that has violated accepted international norms (Litwak, 2000). George Bush’s famous ‘Axis of Evil’ comprising Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and other states could also be referred to as rogue states.

States that violate Human Rights

As the name suggests, this category constitutes states which have been involved in human rights violation at a considerable magnitude. The violation could be through a number of ways. For instance, it could be genocide at varying degrees or setting up and sending people to labour and concentration camps or war crimes which include unjustified destruction of cities. Basically, any breach of humanitarian law would amount to violation of human rights.

Analysis: Responsibility to Protect or Right of Intervention   

This section directly compares R2P, and the three categories of states mentioned above and where it could be applied, with Mill’s idea of intervention/non-intervention in barbaric and civilised lands. In other words, I attempt to find out if the doctrine of R2P amounts to a rebranding of imperial intervention. For reasons of simplicity I would like to refer to Mill’s notion of intervention/non-intervention as Mill’s doctrine through the rest of this section. Also, for organisational purposes, I have included sub-headings in this section in the hope that they will make reading this section easier.

Most Important Differences and Additions

The first strikingly visible difference between the two doctrines is their clarity. As elaborate as the doctrine of R2P is, I would argue that Mill’s ideas are more profound and clearer simply because his core context is of imperialism. Also, his doctrine largely reflected the leading ideas of his time and was not as controversial as the R2P. In terms of the ideas, I would argue that the R2P and Mill’s idea of intervention are largely similar. One major difference between the two doctrines is the introduction of the “Responsibility to Prevent” through an “Early warning capability” (Ban Ki-moon, 2009, p.4) under R2P.

I would argue that this idea is not new one per se but it reflects the notion in Mill’s doctrine that if civilised states have barbaric neighbours, the former cannot and should not hold back for too long, but just intervene and take over from that government or make it militarily dependent. The only difference is that under R2P, states should try to address the root cause and prevent any conflict within the state. This, however, is easier said than done. As the ICISS observed in its report, prevention of a conflict is tough because strong support of the international community is needed almost at all times (ICISS, 2001, p.19).

This was the case in the Kenyan crisis that began in 2007. Thanks to the intervention of the Kofi Annan, mandated by the AU (African Union) and the support of the Secretary General of the UN (United Nations), a power sharing argument was concluded between the warring parties thereby preventing the conflict from escalating into any crimes against humanity.  Having said that, the Responsibility to Prevent is an important inclusion in R2P especially against the backdrop of the intra-state conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda etc. through the 1990s, whose root causes were never addressed.

Rebranding of Imperial Intervention?

This brings us to the more important issue of whether the modern doctrine of R2P is a rebranding of imperial intervention or the kind of intervention Mill spoke of? My answer to this question is yes, the doctrine of R2P is, largely, a rebranding of imperial intervention as proposed by Mill.

However, R2P is not as overt as the Mill doctrine. For instance, Mill supported intervention in the so called barbaric states and non-intervention in the so called civilised ones. The reasons: intervention would benefit of the natives of the so called barbaric state and that annexing another civilised nation would be immoral, unless the nation chooses to do so willingly (Mill, 1859). On this note, it would be interesting to have a look at the current situation. In the current scenario, terms like civilised and barbaric may not be used anymore, at least not overtly. They have been replaced by terms like failed states, rogue states and states that violate humanitarian rights. The characteristics of such states (as highlighted in the previous section) could easily replace Mill’s notion of barbaric states (even though he did not really elaborate on what constitutes a barbaric state). This kind of state branding has become more popular since the end of the Cold War.

Mill also spoke about a vague notion of international morality. Though he did not elaborate on its principles, it’s not very difficult to guess what these might have been. The world, for Mill, was divided into civilised Christian nations and barbaric states completely unfit to have rights as nations. So, international morality would have comprised of the principles and beliefs (probably based on Christianity) of the so called civilised nations.

On a similar note, it could be argued that the new international morality is global peace and security. Any violations of the same would first result first in the state getting branded as a failed state or rogue state and followed by sanctions and other punitive actions. In essence, intervening states might carry out their Responsibility to React and even the Responsibility to Rebuild, if military action is undertaken. This, however, can be slightly problematic. As Finnemore argues, if the situation warrants military intervention it usually means a change of government (Finnemore, 2004, 136).

What’s more, the R2P doctrine also sanctions the use of military force (ICISS, 2001, p.32). It’s perfectly possible that a state or group of states might use this as a licence. As Finnemore points out, intervention and change of government is not undertaken for altruistic reasons but sheerly because the states believe it’s the best solution (Finnemore, 2004. p.136). A good example here could be the global war on terror which began after 9/11 attacks under US leadership. The other problem with regard to the R2P doctrine is that it is definitely prone to abuse by the powerful states. For instance, Russia justified its intervention in South Ossetia, against Georgia, through R2P. The Russian leadership maintained that atrocities committed by the Georgian troops amounted to genocide. The Russian claim was rejected by almost everyone who witnessed this episode (Bellamy, 2010, p.151). To sum up, the doctrine of R2P does amounts rebranding of imperial intervention or the Mill doctrine and because of the creation of the R2P doctrine, classical imperial intervention has become more institutionalised than it was during 19th century and the 1st half of the 20th century.

Conclusion

This essay compared and examined Mill’s notion of intervention/non-intervention and the doctrine of R2P to assess if the latter is a rebranding of imperial intervention. This was demonstrated by first presenting Mill’s ideas on intervention and non-intervention which included his distinction between civilised and barbaric states and the scenarios where interventions would be justified. The next section covered the R2P doctrine by explaining its main points as conceived in the ICISS report and their implementation by the UN. This section also examined the notions of failed states, rogue states and states that violate human rights.

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  • Ban Ki-moon. (2009). Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General. 12 January, 2009. http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf
  • Bellamy, A, J. (2010). The Responsibility to Protect: Five Years On. Ethics and International Affairs. Vol No.: 24. No.: 2. 2010: 143-169
  • Foreign Policy. (2005). The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy. No.: 149. Jul-Aug 2005: 55-65.
  • Finnemore, M. (2004). The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Cornell University Press, New York. 2004
  • Hobson, J, A. (1902). Imperialism: A Study. George Allen & Unwin, London. August 1902.
  • ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty). (2001). The Responsibility to Protect. International Development Research Centre. 2001. http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf
  • Kuperman, A. (2008). The Moral Hazards of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans. International Studies Quarterly. 2008. 52: 49-80.
  • Litwak, R, S. (2000). A look at Rogue States a Handy Label but a Lousy Policy. The Washington Post. February 20, 2000. http://www.nucnews.net/nucnews/2000nn/0002nn/000220nn.htm
  • N.B: There are plenty of reports on this link. Please use the find feature (Ctrl+F) and search using author’s name or the topic.
  • Rotberg, R, I. (2002). Failed States in a World of Terror. Foreign Policy. Vol No.: 81. No.: 4: 127-140.
  • Walzer, M. (1977). Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Penguin. 1977.

A Nobel Intervention?

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Why did the Nobel Committee Award the Peace Prize to Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf one week before the Presidential election?

Victory Assured?

By Jack Hamilton, 7 Oct, 2011

Today’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has stirred controversy.  The ‘Iron Lady’ said this morning that she is humbled by the award and has stated that it is an award for the people of Liberia.  However, the timing of the award, coming one week before the Presidential elections in Liberia, has brought forth claims of the Norwegian-based Nobel Committee interfering in the internal politics of the West African state.

President Sirleaf’s main rival in next weeks’ election, Winston Tubman, has lambasted the decision of the Nobel Committee instead declaring that “She brought war here, she is a warmonger” to the BBC Voice on Africa programme.

Such vitriol is nothing new to the first elected female leader in Africa having risen to prominence in 2005 following a civil war that left a quarter of a million people dead and the Liberian economy in tatters.  This is not the issue.  Rather it is the question of the timing of the award in such close proximity to the election.

Nobel Committee Chairman Thorbjoern Jagland has told reporters today that the committee does not consider domestic politics in its selection process and the spokesperson for the Liberian National Election Commission, Nathan Mulbah, has already stated that the election will go ahead as planned on October 11, four days from the award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Peace by ‘Peace’

The Nobel Committee is no stranger to controversial timing.  Awarding the prize to Barack Obama was seen by many as an over-zealous attempt by the organisation to garner attention by affixing itself to a popular President who had achieved little in the way of international peace at the time of the presentation (aside from the snide observation that he may have won due to the simple fact that he was not George W Bush).  That has since been described as an incentive for the President to foster peace and security throughout the globe.  This function of the peace prize should not be overlooked.

In 1998 David Trimble and John Hume were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their roles in facilitating the Good Friday Agreement and ushering in a more peaceful era in Northern Ireland.  This was by no means a solid peace deal.  Similar agreements had been reached at Sunningdale in 1973 and at Hillsborough in 1985 but failed spectacularly.  The prize was a recognition of the start of a process and acted as a lightning rod for the global attention at a time when atrocities in were being carried out in the Balkans and al-Qaeda had struck in Nairobi.

While the Peace Prize did not create the peace in Northern Ireland it associated the terms of ‘Northern Ireland’ and ‘peace’ at a global level which certainly acted as a catalyst to maintain some semblance of dialogue. It is difficult to ascertain the motives of the Committee with any great deal of certainty but one assume that they are attempting to bring the world together piece by piece: peace by ‘peace’.

Ballots not Bullets

This brings me back to Liberia.  The elections will take place in a few days and there is no doubting that the Nobel Peace Prize has again drawn attention to an ongoing peace process.  The Committee is surely aware that their award will have an impact on the election.  Is it so wrong that they have chosen a woman who so clearly embodies the values the Nobel Committee stand for?  Sirleaf has been instrumental in transforming Liberia from a post-conflict country to a developing one.  Under her the economy has grown by 6.5%, free and compulsory primary education has been introduced, and doctors’ salaries have doubled.  Furthermore, the election has so far been described by the electoral observers of the Carter Center as “peaceful” and “fair” as healthy competition remains between the two frontrunners, Sirleaf and Tubman.

The timing of the decision will be used by the opponents of Sirleaf to frame her as a puppet of foreign interests but it was not her choice.  However it was Sirleaf’s actions led to her accolade and these actions will surely prove to be more influential come October 11.  Neither Sirleaf nor the people of Liberia are the puppets of foreign intervention and such a claim devalues the progress that has been made in the past six years.

Today’s award is recognition of those achievements as well as an incentive to continue the difficult rebuilding process, whatever the outcome of the election.  However with the objectives of the Nobel Committee being repeatedly questioned, the jury is out on the future of the prize.

Jack Hamilton can be followed on Twitter @jmhamilton

Assessing the impact of the Iranian revolution on the world beyond the Middle East

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By Matthias Pauwels, 7 Oct, 2011

When an uneasy coalition of religious leaders, secular intellectuals, and bazaar merchants spearheaded the anti-Shah movement in Iran, the Iranian revolution would cause ripples well beyond the Middle East as the new regime began alienating once close western allies, mainly the United States. In the Khomeini era, US foreign policy toward Iran would shift from one of total commitment to one on the defence, embedded in Iran’s rampant anti-Americanism.

As Khomeini’s triumph was a blow to America’s credibility, it encompassed a boost to Soviet diplomacy in the region, especially in the early days of a nascent revolution. However, Iran’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union would prove to be extremely bipolar, ranging from Moscovian hopes of fruitful development of good neighbourliness to large-looming mistrust in the Moscow-Tehran relationship.

Moreover, at the time of the 1979 revolution, and repeatedly since, political analysts have argued that Western Europe would enjoy a better, privileged, and more stable relationship with Tehran. But as the course of history proved, normalisation – or even reconciliation – with the Iranian government did not eventuate as hoped. On the contrary, the dream of a reasonable Iran and a compliant Western Europe has not been realised (Halliday, 1994: 309).

In this essay, I will discuss how the Iranian revolution and the Khomeini era have influenced Iran’s bilateral ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Drawing back upon the pre-revolutionary foreign policies of the aforementioned, the revolution has caused a considerable tension, not to mention alteration, in the international community’s foreign policy track record toward Iran. As the Carter administration had the greatest difficulties manoeuvring its way around the Khomeinist ideological view of America and as the political hot potato of the American embassy hostage crisis unfolded, the United States found itself simultaneously confronted with a massive brain drain from Iran, where the departure of a large number of highly educated elite was embedded in the political impetus of the revolution and its aftermath. Consequently, I will not only address the impact of the revolution on Iran’s bilateral ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Western Europe, but I will additionally discuss the socio-economic impact of the extent of brain drain from Iran to the United States.

The end of American geopolitical determinism toward Iran

The triumph of the Khomeini forces and of the Iranian revolution in February 1979 marked the beginning of a highly critical period in American-Iranian relations. For the United States, the Iranian crisis was a wasteful diversion, conflicting with real American interests and intentions. For both the Shah and the US, a decade-long embryonic American involvement in Iran had paid off handsomely in the initial stages (Ramazani, 1982: 9). By making security and military ties with the United States the centrepiece of his American policy, the Shah had successfully projected himself as a full-fledged American ally, hoping to resolve basic problems of political legitimacy and authority of his regime partly with the aid of the United States. But just as the Shah’s wooing and winning of American support for his regime was anchored in his domestic policy of strengthening his security forces and boosting economic modernisation, the US had its own reasons for involvement in Iran. The imagery that prevailed among US policy makers was a classic Cold War one and the Shah, in this view, was a major regional surrogate of American policy and could be counted on to ‘stem a red tide sweeping the Horn of Africa, South Yemen, and Afghanistan.’ (Cottam, 1980: 298). Drawing back upon the Shah’s anti-communist stance, the American prevailing view of Iran was one of a stable, progressive, and anti-communist regime.

When it became clear to Washington that the Shah’s regime was on the verge of toppling in 1978-1979, American policy toward Iran became enmeshed in ambiguity. Although the Carter administration was initially hesitant to publicly denounce the Shah, Washington was more than convinced by the beginning of 1979 that the Shah’s regime was finished.In the early stages, relations between the United States and the Khomeini regime were cool but not hostile (Snyder, 1999: 277). When the United States accepted the downfall of the stabilised Bakhtiyar government and his replacement by the moderate Bazargan cabinet, appointed by Khomeini himself, US policy toward Iran was still embedded in a Cold War thought pattern where Iran remained a pivotal state in America’s anti-communist crusade. Since Washington’s main global and even regional problem was not Iran but the Soviet Union and its influence, a stable and united Iran was an American objective no matter who ruled in Tehran. Therefore, US post-revolution policy was premised on the assumption that ‘the emerging Islamic Republic was an established fact and the Department of State was prepared to establish correct formal relations with the new regime.’ (Snyder, 1999: 277) Since Washington’s greatest fear during the first months of the revolutionary government was of a leftist takeover with possible Soviet assistance, a consideration which was further sharpened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,  the Carter administration had every intention to show the new regime its friendly intentions through various gestures, including face-to-face meetings, rapid recognition of the Bazargan regime, and material cooperation (Rubin, 1980: 311). However, US-Iranian relations gradually turned sour, finally leading to Iran’s rabid anti-Americanism. The idea that President Carter sought to build a new and friendly relationship with Iran never penetrated the radical fraction of the revolution, who cleverly manipulated the hostage crisis to their advantage in order to weed out the liberal fractions of the revolution. The idea that the global hegemon was still keen on dictating events within Iran and Iranian political culture was a crucial aspect of the Khomeinist ideological view of the United States. Even when Khomeini called for an unapologetic isolationism, thus breaking away from the omnipotence of American influence, the Reagan administration still attempted to befriend Tehran for years in spite of the hostility it demonstrated toward the United States, and this because of Iran’s anti-Soviet foreign policy. Geo-political considerations remained a pivotal part of US post-revolution foreign policy toward Iran, anchored in wishful thinking that the more radical ardour of the revolution would gradually cool and moderates, pragmatists, and technocrats would emerge as dominant in Tehran.

However, the hostage issue proved to be a critical stage in the alteration of Washington’s foreign policy toward Iran. As Rubin (1980: 316) notes, the frustrating spectacle of over fifty American representatives being held as prisoners month after month in the face of seeming US impotence had a tremendous psychological effect on America’s relationship with Iran. In the early Spring of 1980, Carter radically changed his policy of rapprochement after the Iranians had failed to comply with various agreements with Algerian third-party mediators. Moreover, as Tehran adopted a policy of complete isolationism, declaring to default on its foreign commitments in the autumn of 1979, including loans by American banks with a total capital exposure of $2.2 billion in Iran, Carter made the inevitable but wise decision of freezing the assets of the Iranian government in the US. Had it not been for this decision, the unilateral action by Tehran could have had serious repercussions for some US banks, vis-à-vis possibly triggering a severe financial crisis.

Within the United States, the hostage issue had its own impact on domestic politics and the Presidential election campaign. The high visibility of the question in the closing days of the campaign brought into vivid focus Carter’s inability to secure the hostages’ freedom (Rubin, 1980: 320). The Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights and reform and its stress on regional approaches rather than on a globalist geopolitical strategy – a policy often mentioned by right-wing globalists as the main culprit for the fall of the Shah’s regime – seemed to become the likely victim of a new era that was ushered into American diplomacy. As stated earlier, the Republican view concerning Iran did not push Reagan toward an antagonistic Iranian foreign policy initially, but the ongoing hostage crisis did accelerate the breakdown in relations between the two countries. The combination of Khomeini’s anti-Americanism and the hostage dilemma played a pivotal role in altering the mood in Washington, moving away from attempting to achieve détente and instead adopting a knee-jerk, hard-line policy toward Tehran. Blunt policy instruments such as economic embargoes and military threats in seeking to pressure the regime to change its ideological perspectives have only strengthened the Khomeinist anti-American push for isolationism. Perhaps Rubin (1980; 323) summarises the policy paradox of US-Iranian relations in the post-shah era in the most spot-on manner: ‘never before have cordial relations with a stable regime in Iran seemed more important to American geopolitical interests; never before has such a state of affairs seemed more unlikely.’

Impact of Iranian brain drain on American civil society

Not only Washtingon’s geopolitical interests toward Iran suffered a blow in the post-revolution era. The United States found itself additionally confronted with a considerable brain drain from Iran to the United States, measured by the migration rates of Iranian nationals to the US with tertiary education, including physicians and professors. Whilst economic-related factors are normally the main driving force for migration, in the case of Iran, political factors are found to be the main push force. With Khomeini on a mission to de-Westoxicate the higher education system in Iran, universities were officially closed from April 1980 for about three years under the banner of the so-called Cultural Revolution. Consequently, secular students and professors who opposed the remodelling of Iran’s education system according to Islamic ideals and beliefs, were purged and the newly established regime began a large-scale crackdown against any oppositional forces. In the 1981-1996 period, Iran was ranked fifth among countries with the highest numbers of refugees admitted to the US (Torbat, 2002: 276). Moreover, in the 1979-1980 period, at the hight of the revolution, the number of Iranian students enrolled in the United States reached its peak of 51,310, leaving Iran to be the country with the highest number of students in the United States at the time compared to any other country (Torbat, 2002: 277). The purging of the educated elite who left Iran and the new graduates abroad who chose not to return home created a large pool of highly educated and skilled Iranian professionals in the United States, causing Iran to experience a huge amount of human and financial capital flight. Whilst the departure of highly educated elite and university students from Iran caused a social loss to the country, it has provided the United States – a country that was built on immigrant human capital – with an unbridled opportunity to incorporate the Iranian educated elite in American global civil society, since they are the medium for transferring technology and know-how.  In this light, Torbat (2002: 273) mentions Bozorghmehr, Sabagh and Ansari, who all agree that Iranians are one of the high status immigrant groups, whose educational achievements trump those of others, thus leaving them to achieve rapid success in the American global civil society. Almost half of the educated elite who left Iran after the revolution reside in California (Torbat, 2002: 278), with a brain drain percentage of roughly twenty percent of Iranian medical doctors in the years after the revolution (Torbat, 2002: 283). As the brain drain caused a significant national loss for Iran due to the fact that education is a public good, for the United States the pool of educated, high-skilled Iranians  surely must have contributed to the society’s well-being and knowledge, and as such it is enmeshed in the frame of side-effects in post-revolution, vis-à-vis deteriorating US-Iranian relations.

The Soviet Union and post-revolutionary Iran: memories of a failed rapprochement

As Rubinstein (1981: 599) mentions, Moscow watched the toppling of the Shah and the unfolding of the Iranian Revolution with mingled anticipation and anxiety: no other internal upheaval and political turnabout had brought such immediate gain and promising opportunity. Whilst Khomeini’s triumph was a blow to America’s influence in the region, it seemed promising for the Soviet Union as the Ayatollah began the process of de-Westernisation and thus de-capitalisation. Moscow regarded the Iranian situation as complex but promising, hoping to bend it to its advantage in the bipolar power struggle frame of the Cold War.

In the early days of the revolution, the unfolding of the new government appeared to be fruitful for Moscovian Cold War politics. As two American-manned electronic intelligence collection stations on Iranian soil, adjacent to the Soviet border, were shut down, politicians in the Kremlin surely must have gloated. Additionally, in an early post-revolutionary phase and the confusion that accompanied the move from Iran’s alignment to non-alignment in regard to the United States, Moscow learnt a great deal about some of the most advanced military hardware in the American arsenal (Rubinstein, 1981: 601). And with the communist and pro-Moscow Tudeh party back on the political horizon in Iran, the Soviet Union cherished high hopes that it would manipulate post-revolution developments to its advantage.

Alas, the Soviet Union was not able to push through a harmonious rapprochement with the Khomeini regime and Moscow had largely itself to blame. As the Kremlin became troubled by the chaotic environment surrounding the turbulent post-revolutionary year, Iran grew more wary of the Soviet Union’s true intentions. Many in Khomeini’s entourage were deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union, mainly due to ingrained anti-communism, a remnant from the Shah era, and the communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978. As Brezhnev tried to push his luck by insisting on reaffirming Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian defence treaty, bilateral relations took a turn for the worse. The treaty claimed that if a third country threatened to attack the Soviet Union from Iranian territory, Soviet forces would be able to intervene in Iranian affairs in the interest of self-defence. With US-Iranian relations suddenly deteriorating due to the hostage crisis, the Soviet Union was suddenly provided with a rare opportunity to demonstrate its support for Iran’s revolutionary regime, diverting attention away from its involvement in Afghanistan. But as Moscow immediately moved to exploit the mounting tension, hoping to win the trust of the Khomeini government, Brezhnev and his policy advisers were only too clever by half: their transparent pro-Iranian position on the hostage issue failed to ingratiate itself with Tehran, thus deflecting Iranian criticism away from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Rubinstein, 1981: 605). As Soviet occupation of Afghanistan became a major impediment to improved relations between Moscow and Tehran, anti-communist slurs began to emanate themselves from the Khomeini regime. Despite Moscow’s assurance that it would stand by Iran and not tolerate outside, hence American, interference in Iran’s internal affairs, and its veto on a Security Council resolution calling for ratcheting up economic sanctions against Iran, Tehran sharply denounced Russia’s military intervention in Afghanistan. Moreover, its insistence on the validity of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty served as an ever-present reminder of Russian imperial ambitions, validating Khomeini’s claim for an unapologetic isolationism. In many ways, the Kremlin was its own worst enemy on the matter of normalisation (Rubinstein, 1981: 603) and thus was not able to benefit fully from the Iranian Revolution and the breakdown of US-Iranian relations.

Western Europe during and after the Khomeini period

At the time of the revolution and shortly after, political analysts shared the expectation that Iran’s relations with Western Europe would be better than those with the United States or even the Soviet Union. Not caught in the middle of an all-consuming Cold War struggle, Europe had adopted a policy of “neither West nor East” (Halliday, 1994: 312), resulting in the fact that European countries – such as Germany – had become Iran’s major trading partners. Therefore it seemed reasonable that a post-revolutionary Iran would not take any drastic measures to offset its relationship with Western Europe, since the Khomeini regime had opted for a strict non-alignment with the United States and therefore had limited the direct importation of as many US products into Iran as possible.

Whilst Britain had been associated by the Khomeini regime with the external domination of Iran in the preceding decades, this was not true of for instance Germany or France. In the commercial realm, Germany’s percentage of the total Iranian import market went up gradually to reach a staggering 26 percent share in the post-revolutionary years (Halliday, 1994: 313). And perhaps France was the country that might have been expected to establish the most favourable relations with Iran, given Khomeini’s residence in Neuphle-le-Chateau from October 1978 to February 1979 in exile (Halliday, 1994: 313).

Illusions about harmonious post-revolutionary relations with Iran remained a stubborn element in West-European foreign policy towards the Khomeini regime. Although Germany’s Genscher became the first Western foreign minister to visit the Iranian nation in 1984 after the revolution of 1979, improving bilateral relations proved to be a shaky endeavour for both France and Germany. Factors such as breaching diplomatic immunity during the hostage crisis at the American embassy in Iran and Tehran’s revolutionary foreign policy, shifting away from cooperation towards unapologetic isolationism, made the West take a more critical stance toward the Khomeini regime. Therefore, the querulous history of Iran’s relations with Western Europe in the post-revolutionary period were not the result of accident or aberration on the Western European side, but reflected deeper incompatibilities on both sides (Halliday, 1994: 315).

Conclusion

The Iranian revolution has impacted the world beyond the Middle East on numerous levels. Diplomatic relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union have suffered. The Shah’s downfall drastically altered Iran’s international posture vis-à-vis other nations and most notably the United States. Iran’s fierce independence and unapologetic non-alignment has annoyed the United States because of the Islamic Republic’s geostrategic significance as well as its refusal to compromise its national sovereignty and dignity in any way, thus popularising the view of Iran as a rogue state, refusing to abide by the global hegemon’s dictates. In the post-revolutionary years, diplomatic efforts have not been successful in hemming in the fringes of fanaticism and militancy, leaving a possible US-Iran détente to be nothing but a far-flung utopian dream. The Soviet Union tried wooing and winning Ayatollah Khomeini in the post-revolutionary years but ultimately lost Iran as a trump card in the Cold War struggle with the United States, mainly due to Moscow’s transparent policies and greediness in reeling Iran in as an ally against the Americans.

List of references

  • Bill, J. A., 1999. Iran and the United States: A Clash of Hegemonies. Middle East Report, No. 212, Pushing the Limits: Iran’s Islamic Revolution at Twenty (Autumn 1999), p. 44-46
  • Ramazani, R. K., 1982. Who lost America? The case of Iran. Middle East Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Winter 1982), p. 5-21
  • Cottam, R. W., 1980. American Policy and the Iranian Crisis. Iranian Studies, Vol. 13, No. ¼, Iranian Revolution in Perspective (1980), p. 279-305
  • Fatemin, K., 1980. The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic Relations with the United States. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Nov. 1980), p. 303-317
  • Halliday, F., 1994. An Elusive Normalization: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution. Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 309-326
  • Panah, M. H., 2002. Social Revolution: The Elusive Emergence of an Agenda in International Relations. Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 2002), p. 271-291
  • Ramazani, R. K., 1982. The U.S. role in the Iranian Revolution and the collapse of U.S. influence. In: Ramazani, R. K., 1982. The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), Ch. 7
  • Rubin, B., 1980. American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1981. Iranian Studies, Vol. 13, No. ¼, Iranian Revolution in Perspective (1980), p. 307-326
  • Rubinstein, A. Z., 1981. The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn 1981), p. 599-617
  • Snyder, R. S., 1999. The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jun. 1999), p. 265-290
  • Torbat, A. E., 2002. The Brain Drain from Iran to the United States. Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No.2 (Spring 2002), p. 272-295

Understanding the Anna Hazare Movement through Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory

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In this article, the author observes Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption agitation through the lens of Kingdon’s ‘Multiple Streams’ hypothesis. 

By Siddharth Singh, 4 Oct, 2011

It can be argued that India faces graver concerns that need far more attention than the issue of graft and corruption in the administration: issues such as farmer suicides, chronic malnutrition, religion-based violence, human rights violations, female foeticide, police excesses especially in rural India and the lack of justice in the Bhopal gas tragedy case. While activists like Irom Sharmila have been protesting against government apathy and excess for decades, it took a then-unknown Anna Hazare to upheave the political landscape of New Delhi in a matter of months. His agitation – incorrectly dubbed as India’s version of the ‘Arab Spring’ by a few international journalists – gave a semblance of the fast-tracking of an anti-corruption legislation which was in limbo for decades. Why did Anna succeed where others did not?

In order to explain why certain policy proposals emerge rather than others, political scientist John Kingdon has stated that three streams of actions need to converge: the problem stream (the problem must be clearly defined), the solution stream (feasible solutions need to be offered), and the political stream (where political consensus must be obtained). He added that chance plays a big role in the convergence of these streams. This model of Multiple Streams differed from the traditional models which have been described to be ‘linear’. The traditional models focused stepwise on, firstly,  problem identification, secondly, focusing government attention to the problem (known as ‘agenda setting’), thirdly policy proposal development and finally, the adoption of policies.

However, such traditional models inadequately explain the Hazare phenomenon and the relative failure of other activists and agitations in India. Kingdon’s framework is better suited to explain the success of the ‘Gandhian’ Anna Hazare over others. He explains that the convergence of the three ‘streams’ creates a window of opportunity during which policy makers are willing to seriously consider legislation aimed at improving a situation or solving a problem. Anna Hazare’s agitation met this condition while others – such as the Bhopal agitation – have not. In order to understand why, we must first delve further into these three streams and then contextualise it.

The problem stream is related to the recognition of the problem and the conditions that affect their recognition. Scholars have stated that systematic indicators such as dramatic events and crises facilitate public knowledge of the problem.

The solutions or policy stream concerns itself with the strategies that are needed to tackle the identified problem. These strategies and proposals exist as a “soup of ideas” that are generated by a community of researchers, advocates, public officials, and the civil society. These ideas are not static, and continue to mix with other ideas, morph and evolve. The survival of the proposal is determined by their technical feasibility, administrative practicability, compatibility with the dominant values of the society, as well as the national mood and political support.

The political stream is related to the politics that affect the chosen solution. Such politics emanates from electoral compulsions and interest-groups. Proposals that are most likely to rise to the top are the ones that match national mood, are congruent with the government and administration, and also enjoy the support of interest-groups.

The meeting of these three streams results in the formation of policy. It hence becomes clear how Anna Hazare and his team garnered considerable success while – say – Irom Sharmila hasn’t.

The Indian public has been constantly informed of scams after scams at the national and sub-national level over the past few years. The hyperactive media has brought corruption to the forefront while other issues – such as the agrarian crisis and farmer suicides – have not found favour with the media. The oft-spoken of common man in India (at least, in the Indian cities and where there is high penetration of television media), already burdened with corruption in almost all walks of life, saw their frustration with the government and politicians in general peak with the 2G spectrum scam, which implicated ministers at the highest echelons of the administration.

It is here that Anna Hazare and his team was able to garner support with a ‘Gandhian’ hunger strike and a proposal for a Jan Lokpal – Citizen Ombudsman – Bill. This Bill called for a radical overhaul of the anti-corruption machinery in India, even as it concentrated powers into one department which was entrusted to fight corruption. Social media and television media was optimally utilised to sell the idea that this Bill would free India from corruption. His team convinced the people that the Lokpal Bill as framed by the government was spineless and would be ineffective. The ‘silence’ of Prime Minister Dr. Singh and distractive verbal onslaught by Congress Party spokespersons further convinced the people of the same.

The current government had stated that they would introduce the Lokpal Bill this term. However, popular mistrust of the government, parliament and legislatures by the public, coupled with a carefully constructed ‘Gandhian’ image of Anna Hazare (which has been questioned by a few journalists and scholars over his ‘undemocratic’ dictums in his village), led the public to find resonance with the radical Jan Lokpal Bill. Such a feeling was strengthened by  an undemocratic and foolish move by the government to detain Anna Hazare just before his second round of protests, and lodge him in the same prison where the accused of the massive scams had been imprisoned. The symbolism of this move was profound, and the opposition claimed that this brought back memories of the Emergency period, when democracy in India had taken a back-seat under the rule of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The public was outraged and there was a massive outpouring of support to Anna and an unequivocal condemnation of the government’s move. A chicken run and a strategic shift within the government ensued. The government began working towards amending their version of the Bill ‘to give it more teeth’. On the other hand, scholarly discourse was largely critical of Team Anna’s Bill because of the behemothic size and lack of effective accountability of the proposed Lokpal. Unknown to the public was the fact that Team Anna revised their bill several times (more than 150 times, according to an Anna team member) to ‘mellow’ it down and make it more feasible due to the pressure of the academia as well as certain sections of the media. The government, on the other hand, proposed that their Bill would be reviewed by the Parliamentary Standing Committee, which had in the past amended a ‘weak’ Right to Information Bill draft and made it one of the most effective legislation to fight corruption and graft that India has seen. This Bill was passed by the parliament under the very same government in its previous term. However, public support (at least in the cities and small towns as reported by the media) of the parliament and politicians had hit rock-bottom. Anna Hazare and his team used this mistrust of the government to successfully get the parliament to accept a few terms and conditions, as no politician wanted to be seen opposing Anna in any manner.

While both the government and Team Anna changed their positions to reach their respective half-ways, the protest was perceived by the public as  a success of Team Anna and a censure of the politicians. The coming to light of the scams in a big way and the political churning that ensued fit neatly into the problem and solution streams of Kingdon’s framework respectively. In order for the Lokpal to see the light of the day, the political stream would also have to meet the other two streams in the near future.

Today, there are calls of resistance against the merger of existing anti-corruption agencies with the proposed Lokpal agency. Such resistance comes from the agencies themselves, and these form the interest-groups that Kingdon mentions. Unless the positions of the interest groups don’t align with the political outlook and popular opinion, there will be no easy passage of a Lokpal Bill. It can be reasonably argued that owing to the political and public pressure, this stream will also begin to tend towards the others in the near future.

On the other hand, issues such as farmer suicides, the continuing problems of the Bhopal survivors and the excesses related to the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act – ASFPA – have not found resonance with the public at large. The cause of repealing ASFPA, for example, remains controversial because many claim that it is against the interests of ‘national security’ and because of the untainted image of the Army among the public. In the case of farmer suicides, there is a severe lack of reporting in the national media. Journalists such as P. Sainath have stated that more national journalists cover a single fashion show in Mumbai than the total number who report on the agrarian crisis in India – a sector that impacts upwards of 60% of India’s population.

The three streams as laid by Kingdon’s framework hence seem to be bending towards each other fairly well in the case of the Jan Lokpal Bill, but are distant in other cases. It may become imperative for the leaders of other movements to go the extra mile to frame the issues appropriately. However unfortunately, it is chance that will play a major role in determining the success – in the form of implementation of respective policies – of agitations.

The author can be followed on Twitter @siddharth3